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Forell: Lawyers, Clients and Sex

LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND SEX:
BREAKING THE SILENCE
ON THE ETHICAL AND
LIABILITY ISSUES
CAROLINE FORELL*

Over against one wall was a black
leather couch - not a davenport, not a settee,
but simply a battered old leather couch. I
was determined that the psychiatrists
couldn't hog all the comfort. My waggish
Irish lawyer friend Parnell McCarthy occasionally teased me that here is where I tested the virtue of my lady divorce clients. 1
The State Bar said it will not file charges
that (Marvin) Mitchelson sexually assaulted former clients Patricia French and
Kristin Barrett-Whitney. The bar concluded that the women, who complained about
the alleged rapes more than three years
ago, had given insufficient evidence of misconduct.

Each woman claims she was raped by
Mitchelson in his private bathroom which is
connected to his office. The bathroom is
styled like a master bath in a home, with a
whirlpool-size tub, wall-to-wall carpeting
and the infamous wallpaper: a tapestry of
hundreds of Rubenesque nudes.
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law; J.D. University
oflowa, 1978. My thanks to Sarah Krick for her valuable research and editing contributions to this Article and for her friendship. My thanks also to Chapin Clark, Ellen
Adler and Suzanne Chanti for their helpful insights. Finally, my thanks to the
Women's Law Forum students at Golden Gate Law School, most notably Suzanne
Bachman, Paula Ohliger, and Fran Radford for their assistance in preparing this
Article for publication and to Nancy Farmer for her tireless clerical support.
1. ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 5-6 (1958).
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The Los Angeles County District
Attorney's Office decided in early 1987 not
to prosecute the rape charges, citing a lack
of evidence. French then sued Mitchelson
for sexual assault and lost in Los Angeles
Superior Court; Barrett-Whitney sued but
has not brought her case to trial.
However, a state victim's compensation
board awarded $46,000 to Barrett-Whitney
and $10,000 to French to pay for medical and
psychiatric treatment, putting pressure on
the State Bar investigation. A Los Angeles
County grand juror fueled the controversy
when he resigned over the district attorney's handling of the case.
Meanwhile, another woman sued
Mitchelson for malpractice and claimed that
he used her for sex. She won the case but
received no damages. 2
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than a few divorce lawyers have sex with their clients. 3
They aren't the only ones. Caselaw reveals that attorneys in
other specialties do too.· The overwhelming number of cases
where a lawyer's sexual relations with a client reach the attention of the public involve male attorneys and their female
clients. 6 These cases do not involve violation of ethical rules
2. L.A. Daily J., May 2, 1990, at 11, col. 3.
3. See, e.g., Suppressed v. Suppressed, 206 Ill. App. 3d 918, 565 N.E.2d 101 (1990);
Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d 1198 (N.H. 1990); In re Frick, 694 S.W. 2d 473 (Mo. 1985).
4. See, e.g., In re Ofelt, 1 D.B. Rptr. 22 (Or. 1985); In re Gibson, 124 Wis. 2d 466,
369 N.W.2d 695 (1985); In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1986); In re Wolf, 312 Or.
655, _ P.2d _ (1992).
5. P. RUTTER, SEX IN THE FORBIDDEN ZONE 22 (1989) "96% ... of sexual exploitation by professionals occurs between a man in power and a woman in his care .... " See
also Lyon, Sexual Exploitation of Divorce Clients: The Lawyer Prerogative?, 10 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 159, 168 (1987). See also D. MARSTON, MALICE AFORETHOUGHT: How
LAWYERS USE OUR SECRET RULES TO GET RICH, GET SEX, GET EVEN ... AND GET AWAY
WITH IT 142 (1991).
In other areas involving sex with professionals the numbers are the same. "The over·
welming number oflawsuits alleging psychiatric malpractice because of sexual involve·
ment [are] brought by women.· LeBoeuf, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women
Patients, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 83, 84 (1988). LeBoeuf also points out that women are
almost always the victims. Id. (citing Belote, Sexual Intimacy Between Female Clients and
Male Psychotherapists: Masochistic Sabotage, in 38 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 887B (1978); Bouhoutsos, Holroyd, Lerman, Forer & Greenberg, Sexual Intimacy Between
Psychotherapists and Patients, 14 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & FMC. 185 (1983».
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specifically addressed to attorney-client sexual relationships
because there are no such rules in any American jurisdiction.
This paper examines the existing caselaw concerning attorney-client sexual relationships and the current ethical rules
which may be implicated. Because of the inadequacies in the
present system, and the serious harm caused to both women
clients and the Bar by these inadequacies, I propose changes
in how lawyers regulate themselves and how others are
compensated for lawyer's sexual misconduct.
Some situations where a client complains about her attorney's sexual misconduct are so egregious that the Bar and
courts have no choice but to act. For example, when Jack R.
Wood came before the Indiana Supreme Court for the second
time because he demanded his client perform oral sex in return
for legal services (known as "quid pro quo" sexual misconduct), the court concluded that the previous one-year suspensionS meted out ten years earlier was not severe enough
discipline; it disbarred him. 7 (This time, he had also required
his 16-year-old criminal client to perform in pornographic
films in exchange for representation.)8 One shudders to think
what other sexual misconduct Wood had practiced unpunished during the years between his reinstatement and the
bringing of the new charges.
Cases like that of Jack Wood, however, are the easy ones.
Hard cases involve a well-respected lawyer and his client
who either did not verbally object to having sex at the time or
who, although she protested at first, eventually succumbed
without physical coercion. 9 These are the cases where lawyers
6. In re Wood, 265 Ind. 616, 358 N.E.2d 128 (1976).
7. In re Wood, 489 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ind. 1986). See also D. MARsTON, supra note
3, at 141-42.
8. In re Wood, 489 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1986).
On December 15, 1983, the niece left 'Naked City' when she
became frightened by the increasingly violent nature of the
movies. Respondent called the niece into his office and
requested to see the pictures taken at 'Naked City'.
Respondent asked the niece to make a payment toward the
legal fees owed from her earnings and then offered to reduce
his fee in exchange for oral sex. The niece performed oral sex
with the Respondent in his office.
Id. at 1190.
9. See, e.g., Suppressed v. Suppressed, 206 Ill. App. 3d 918,565 N.E.2d 101 (1990);
Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d 1198 (N.H. 1990).
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demand that their "right of privacy" and "freedom of association" be honored,lo because, after all, "she consented."
These cases also raise the specter of "he said/she said."
Americans have great difficulty believing a woman's charge of
rape or sexual battery when a more socially powerful male
denies it, claiming that it didn't happen, that she initiated it,
or she consented to it. Our post-Anita HilVClarence Thomas
society remains uncertain about the appropriate response to
these claims of rights and freedoms among "consenting" adults.
The right of privacy is often a double-edged sword for
women. Much of the harm women suffer at the hands of men,
including domestic violence, marital rape, and sexual harassment in the workplace, occurs in the private spheres of home
or private sector employment. Behind closed doors men have
been exerting their physical and sexual power over women since
time immemorial. Sex with a client will almost always occur
behind such a closed door.
The right to privacy is an especially suspect defense where
one of the parties is an officer of the court with a fiduciary obligation to protect the other party's interests. II Similarly, freedom of association has limits where sex is involved. The
United States Supreme Court held in Bowers v. Hardwick l2 that
even consensual sexual relations between adult lovers in their
home can be prosecuted as criminal conduct. It therefore follows that neither a state or federal court should find that a prohibition of sexual conduct between a fiduciary and his
beneficiary violates the fiduciary's constitutional right to
freely associate. Certainly none of the numerous prohibitions
on sex with clients in other professions where a fiduciary relationship is recognized, such as social workers, psychologists and
psychiatrists, have raised constitutional concerns. IS
10. See, e.g., Memorandum to Cal. Board B. Governors, Sex-with-Client
Subcomm., Cal. Board B. Governors 5-10 (Apr.10, 1991) [hereinafter B. Governors
Memorandum].
11. The right to privacy argument was rejected in Barbara A v. John G, 145 Cal.
App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 430 (1983). But see B. Governors Memorandum, supra
note 8 (voicing serious concern with this issue).
12. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). (Homosexual sodomy is not protected by the U.S.
Constitution. I find the holding in Bowers outrageous; nevertheless, it is the law of
the land.)
13. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.22.2 (West 1988) (therapist-patient sex a
felony); MINN. STAT. § 148A.02 (1988) (tort liability for therapist-client sex).
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HOW I SELECTED THIS TOPIC

The questions of whether it is unethical for an attorney to
have sex with his client and whether tort liability should be
imposed when attorney-client sexual relations injure the client
have only recently come to the attention of the public and the
Bar. When I attended law school in the mid-seventies, my
Professional Responsibility class did not cover this issue. Nor
is it addressed in many of the legal ethicstextbooks.14
However, my first-year Torts students hear about this issue
within their first few weeks oflaw school. In keeping with tradition, I begin the course with intentional torts. One of the
cases my students read on this topic is the California case of
Barbara A. v. John a. 16 I use this case to demonstrate how a
battery can occur even when a person has consented to physical contact, if the basis for the consent was misrepresentation
or deceit.

Barbara A. is a very disturbing case that brings first-year
law students face to face with both the responsibilities and the
power attorneys have, as well as the pure chutzpah of some of
our less ethical brethren. John is a family law attorney and
Barbara is his former client. John, notably, is the plaintiff in
the case. John sues Barbara for fees he alleges she owes to him
for his representation of her in a post-divorce child and spousal
support matter. According to Barbara's cross-complaint, John
and Barbara had sexual intercourse twice during the time
John represented her. Prior to their first sexual encounter,
Barbara demanded that John use a condom, but he told her not
to worry, saying: "I can't possibly get anyone pregnant." She
understood this to mean he was sterile and proceeded to
engage in unprotected sex with him. As a result, she suffered
an ectoptic pregnancy and required surgery to save her life.
Although my main purpose in using the case is to demonstrate that consent will be invalidatedifits scope is exceeded
or if it was fraudulently induced,16 my students also examine
the ethical issue Barbara raises by alleging that she believed
John's assurances because "[t]he attorney-client relationship
14. See, e.g., T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS
& MATERIALS (5th ed. 1991).
15. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983).
16. [d. at 373, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
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produced in [her] a sense of trust in [John], and shejustifiaby
relied on his representations."17
The Barbara A. court examines the issue of whether the
attorney-client fiduciary duty applies to sexual relations
between an attorney and his client. It concludes that the
fiduciary duty can be breached where physical injury is alleged
to have resulted from its breach. 18 However, contrary to the
ordinary rule of fiduciary duty, which presumes undue influence if a breach of a fiduciary duty is alleged,19 the court holds
that where the injury results from attorney-client sex, the
client has the burden of proving that her attorney's conduct was
wrongful. 20
Since the California court notes that Oregon is the only
state bar to have directly addressed the ethical considerations attorney-client sex presents (via an advisory ethical
opinion)21, a discussion of this matter is particularly appropriate
for Oregon law students. I inform my students that presently no state bar has an ethical rule specifically regulating attorneys' sexual relations with clients, and ask whether this is
appropriate.
The Barbara A. case has bothered me for years. My areas
oflegal expertise include the interrelationship of statutes and
tort law and legal issues affecting women. While on sabbatical in Australia last year, I received an invitation from Golden
Gate University School of Law asking me to submit a proposal for a paper concerning women and the practice of law. My
concerns about whether attorney-client sexual relationships
violate ethical rules and the possibility for these rules to be the
basis for civil liability led me to propose my present paper.
Because I was in Australia at the time I made my proposal, I
was unaware that these issues had moved to the front burner
in three states: California, Oregon and Illinois. As my dean
responded when I recently described my research: "Cutting
edgel"
17. 1d.
18. 1d. at 379, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432.

19.1d.
20. 1d. The court explains: "To hold otherwise would have a chilling and far-reaching effect on any personal relations between an attorney and his clients. The possibility of a factual determination of a confidential relationship should be sufficient
warning to monitor the profession in personal or social relations with clients." 1d. at
379-80; 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33.
21. Or. Board of Governors, Legal Ethics Op. 475 (1982) [hereinafter Op. 475].
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CUTTING EDGE

This paper is a tale of three states. The problems that attorney-client sexual relationships present exist in every jurisdiction, yet California, Illinois and Oregon are the only states
where there has been strong interest in the issue. 22 The Oregon
bar is the only one to address these issues without public
prodding. In contrast, the California bar has been forced to consider these issues by legislative mandate 23 and the Illinois
bar has been forced to consider these issues after widely publicized litigation by clients against their attorneys who had sex
with them. 24
The publicity about the legislation, proposed ethical rules,
attorney debate and civil litigation in California, Illinois and
Oregon has gone national. The New York Times 25 and the
ABA Journa}26 have both published articles on the topic.
However, according to the February 1992 issue of the ABA
Journal, the issue may already be a dead letter. Pointing to the
defeat of a rule in Oregon in October 1991, the California
Supreme Court's failure to adopt a rule despite a legislative
command to do so and the Illinois Supreme Court's failure to
act on this issue despite a legislative resolution, the ABA says
the movement to restrict attorney-client sex has "stumbled" and
"slowed. "27 This issue must not fade from view. The harm to
22. See also Ala. B. Ass'n Comm. on Ethics Op. 88-1 (1988) cited in Report by
SUbcomm. on Attorney-Client Sexual Misconduct, Chicago B. Ass'n Comm. on
Professional Responsibility 28 (Oct. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Chicago B. Ass'n Report]
(The Alaska opinion concluded that:
(1) the lawyer initiates the relationship and the client's
ability to make a free choice is impaired;
(2) the lawyer performs legal services in exchange for sex;
(3) the sexual involvement inhibits the lawyer's ability to
protect the client's interest;
(4) the sexual relationship may adversely atTect the client's
emotional stability; or
(5) the sexual conduct is illega!.).
23. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6106.8 (West 1989).
24. See, e.g., Grady, Crawford & Obrien, Lawyers Exposing "Dirty Little Secret",
Chicago Tribune, Jan. 21, 1992; Wesniewski, Sex with Clients an Unfair Affair,
Chicago Daily Law Bull. 1989, at 1; Warden, Secret Suits, Chicago Lawyer, Apr. 18,
1989, at 1; Gill & Holt, Lawyers Debate Attorney· Client Sex Rule, Chicago Lawyer, Sept.
1991, at 1.
25. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1991, Law Section.
26. Attorney Discipline: Do we need an ethical rule restricting sexual relations with
clients?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1992, at 34-5; California Restricts Attorney-Client Sex, A.B.A.
J., July 1992, at 26.
27. Sex- With-Client Ban Fails, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 24.
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the clients and to the Bar in the absence of a rule expressly condemning exploitative sexual relations between attorneys and
clients is simply too great to ignore.
Until the 1980's, virtually nothing had been written about
the ethics of professionals having sex with their clients,
whether the professionals were psychotherapists, clergy, teachers,28 doctors or lawyers. 29 Since then a few articles have
addressed the problems created when divorce attorneys have
sex with their clients. so
The caselaw is equally scanty. Only three cases have
addressed the issue of whether an attorney can be held civilly liable for injuries resulting from sexual intercourse with his
client: Barbara A. v. John G.31 in 1983; Suppressed v.
28. When I mentioned my views on the topic of attorney-client sex to one of my
former students who now practices law, he immediately asked !De whether I believed
the same prohibitions should apply to law professor-student sex. My answer is a
resounding "yes." The same power dynamics exist in the teacher-student relationship
as well as the same potential for severe psychological harm. Furthermore, the teacher-student relationship has the added negative effect on other students in the class.
I advocate a rule like the one in effect at the University ofIowa which says:
No faculty member shall have an amorous relationship (consensual or otherwise) with a student who is enrolled in a
course being taught by the faculty member or whose academic
work (including work as a teaching assistant) is being supervised by the faculty member.
Faculty members exercise power over students, whether in
giving them praise or criticism, evaluating them, making
recommendations for their further studies or their future
employment, or conferring any other benefits on them.
Amorous relationships between faculty members and stude1nts are wrong when the faculty member has professional
responsibility for the student. Such situations greatly increase
the chances that the faculty member will abuse his or her
power and sexually exploit the student. Voluntary consent
by the student in such a relationship is suspect, given the fundamentally asymmetric nature of the relationship.
P. RU'M'ER, supra note 5, at 188.
29. P. RUITER, supra note 5 at 36. In recent years a number of articles have been
written concerning various professions. See, e.g., LeBoeuf, supra note 5 (psychiatristpatient sex); Cruz, When the Shepard Preys on the Flock: Clergy Sexual Exploitation
and the Search for Solutions, 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 499 (1991) (clergy-parishioner sex).
See generally Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair
Advantage of the "Fair" Sex, 53 ALB. L. REV. 95 (1988).
30. See Dubin, Sex and the Divorce Lawyer: Is the Client Off Limits?, 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 585 (1988); Lyon, supra note 5. See also Angel, Sexual Harassment by
Judges, 45 MIAMI L. REV. 817 (1991).
31. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983). See also McDaniel v. Gile,
230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991) (Intentional infliction of emotional distress and attorney malpractice allowed where attorney failed to effectively represent
his divorce client because she refused his sexual advances.).
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Suppressed 32 in 1990; and Doe v. Roe 33 in 1991. The latter two
cases were brought by two different female clients against
the same well-known Chicago divorce lawyer, who remains
nameless by court order.:U This attorney successfully enjoined
at least one of these women from mentioning his or his firm's
name and had the records sealed from public view. 36 The circumstances surrounding the two Chicago cases are compelling
evidence of a conspiracy to silence the voices of women who
claim their lawyers sexually exploited them. As one judge has
described it, it is the Illinois bar's "dirty little secret. "36
Another reason why this topic is compelling is the mounting evidence of the psychological damage to clients caused by
sexual relations between male professionals and their female
clients, including male lawyers and their female clients.
Psychiatrist Peter Rutter's book Sex in the Forbidden Zone, 37
explains, through the use of numerous case studies, the causes and effects of male professionals' sexual relations with
their female clients. Rutter's book shows both why the temptation to engage in such conduct is so great for a powerful professional male and why a vulnerable female client is not in a
position to resist. 38 Rutter also describes the magnitude of the
psychological damage such relationships cause. Because this
book is so illuminating, I agree with Carol Nadelson, M.D., Past
President of the American Psychiatric Association, who says
that Rutter's book is "[a] landmark book [which] should be read
32.
33.
34.
35.
things:

206 Ill. App. 3d 918, 565 N.E.2d 101 (1990).
756 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
Doe, 756 F. Supp. 353, 360 n.13.
See Warden, supra note 24, at I, 9. The suppression order stated, among other

The record on appeal and trial record is suppressed and
impounded and, when filed, will be maintained in the office
of Gilbert Marchman, Clerk of the Appellate Court, by a
single clerk designated by him as custodian of the file.
(2) During the period ofthis order, the said file and record
shall remain suppressed and impounded and plaintiff, defendants, their agents and attorneys are ordered to refrain
from disclosing or publishing its contents and particularly the
names of the parties and their families, if any, during the
period of this order.
Suppressed v. Suppressed, Suppression Order No.89-2950 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1989).
36. In re Marriage of Kantar, 581 N.E.2d 6, 12 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1991)
(Greiman, J., specially concurring).
37. P. RUTTER, supra note 5.
38. See also D. MARsTEN, supra note 5 (providing a vivid account of the prevalence
of sexual exploitation of women clients by their attorneys).
(1)
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by physicians, therapists, teachers, clergy and lawyers. "39 If!
were teaching a class in Professional Responsibility, it would
be required reading.
In the space remaining I will first explain why attorneyclient sex is a women's issue. I will then discuss why the failure to expressly prohibit attorney-client sexual relations is
detrimental to the legal profession. I will briefly examine the
treatment of the issue in Oregon and California. Then, I will
present and discuss the ethical rule that I propose for adoption
by state bar associations. Next, I will analyze the possible
avenues for civil liability against lawyers who sexually exploit
their clients under both the current ethical rules and advisory opinions and under more specific rules if they were adopted. I will argue for the legislative enactment of statutory
liability should the courts refuse to allow a civil remedy. I will
conclude with the chilling story of the judicial protection of
attorney-client sex in a series of Illinois cases.
IV.

SEX WITH CLIENTS: A WOMEN'S ISSUE

When sex between an attorney and his client occurs, there
is usually a convergence of two power relationships: attorney-client and man-woman. Since the overwhelming majority
of cases involve male attorneys and their female clients, it
should be acknowledged that this, like sexual harassment, is
a women's issue. 4o It is also important to recognize that the
harm a woman client may suffer from sexual involvement
with her attorney will be both different and frequently more
severe than the harm a male client might suffer.
Gender is still a hierarchy in our patriarchal society and the
power a attorney has over his client is enhanced by the power
39. P. RU'M'ER, supra note 5, at 1.
40. I am treating this as a woman's issue despite the fact that, like sexual
harassment and domestic violence, occasionally the injured party will be male. Cf. Gill
& Holt, Lawyers Debate Attorney-Client Sex Rule, CHICAGO LAWYER, Sept. 1991, at 10
(where California legislator Lucille Roybal-Allard, who introduced legislation in
California which mandates that the bar adopt a rule regulating attorney- client sexual relations, stated:
When we talk about this issue, we usually talk about it in
terms of men taking advantage of women .... But we had
calls from male clients saying they had experiences with
female attorneys. We also had calls from gays who had that
experience with male attorneys, so it isn't just a women's
issue).
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he holds over her as a male. This is particularly true when the
relationship changes from strictly business to personal and sexual. Research has shown that men and women view sexual
approaches in business settings very differently. In a recent
hostile work environment sexual harassment case, Robinson
v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.: 1 Dr. Susan Fiske, Professor of
Psychology at the University of Massachussets, testifed that:
Men and women respond to sex issues in the
workplace to a degree that exceeds the normal differences in other perceptual reactions
between them. For example, research reveals
a near flip-flop of attitudes when both men
and women are asked what their response
would be to being sexually approached in the
workplace. Approximately two-thirds of men
said they would be flattered; only fifteen percent would feel insulted. For women the proportions are reversed. 42
It seems logical to assume that men and women's reactions to sexual solicitations by professionals such as their
attorneys is similar to their reactions to sexual solicitations in
the workplace.

Of course, the attorney is not always the initiator of a sexual relationship. Nevertheless, because of the power the attorney possesses and the client's vulnerability, dependency and trust
in her attorney, it remains the attorney's responsibility to prevent a sexual relationship from developing. I maintain that true
consent to sexual intercourse during an attorney-client relationship will rarely occur. I believe that there are women clients
who are capable of such consent, and that there are attorneys
who are capable of retaining the necessary objectivity to ethically
and effectively represent their client's interests while engaging
in a sexual relationship. However, I also believe that it is the
extraordinary situation where neither the client's interests nor
the attorney's professional conduct are adversely affected by their
sexual relationship. As a result, far more often than not, attorneys who have sex with their clients are guilty of, at a minimum,
sexual exploitation. Their clients are indeed victims.
41. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
42. 1d. at 1505. See also P. RUT1'ER, supra note 5, at 64·5 (concerning the different
ways in which men and women view sexualizing of their professional relationship).
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For women who have previously been the victims of male
abuse of power, particulary sexual power, the sexualization of
the attorney-client relationship is, as psychiatrist Peter Rutter
describes it: "the destruction of hope itself."43 For women who
are battered wives or incest or rape victims, the sexualization
of the attorney-client relationship can be nothing less than emotionally devastating.
It is not surprising that most of the cases that have reached
the public's attention have involved divorce attorneys. Usually
the reason a woman consults a divorce attorney is that she
believes that a man (her soon-to-be ex-husband) has ..wronged
her. She will often be emotionally distraught, and will be
seeking someone who will listen and understand not only her
legal but her personal problems.~ Her attorney will play the
roles of both legal problem solver and counselor.

Unfortunately, attorneys are not trained counselors and
may be unaware of or unwilling to acknowledge the intoxicating
effect that role can have on both the counselor and client. As
one psychiatrist has noted:
Due to the psychological tendency on the part of the client
to invest the counselor with all sorts of power, authority, and
a nearly magical belief in their helpfulness, there will ... be a
powerful tendency to bestow affection. These feelings largely
are unrelated to truly personal involvement, and are mostly a
function of the relationship itself. Therefore, for a lawyer to
take advantage of them, would be quite as unethical as making personal use of the client's money or property which has
been entrusted to him in the course of carrying out the professional role.4 5
The effect just described has a technical name: transference.
Psychiatrist Peter Rutter describes this phenomenon as follows:
Transference is a term used in psychotherapy for the powerful feeling that patients
develop toward their therapists. Transference feelings are in some ways a reexperi43. P. RU'M'ER, supra note 5, at 62.
44. See D. MARSTON, supra note 5 at 142·5 for a male perspective of what happens in this situation.
45. Watson, The Lawyer as Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7, 16 (1965). (Andrew S.
Watson was an Associate Professor of Psychiatry of Michigan Medical School and an
Associate Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School.)
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encing of past emotional dynamics within
the family, but in other ways they look to
future possibilities for developing new and
healthier emotional dynamics. For example,
a patient trying to seduce a therapist may be
repeating past injuries but is also most likely searching for a response that will discourage this repetition. The therapist draws
these feelings out of clients because of the
power he has either to reinjure his patients
or to relate to them in a way that will free
them from the wounds of the past .... 46
Rutter asserts that "similar transference dynamics take
place in all ... lawyer-client relationships. "47
A number of courts consider themselves to be transference experts. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court has
found that unregistered psychologists' and social workers'
relationships with their clients involve transference. 48 It has
therefore held that when these professionals engage in sex with
their clients, they breach their fiduciary duty and are subject
to civil tort liability for malpractice. In Corgan v. Meuhling,
the supreme court quoted with approval an earlier lower appellate court case which said:
The "transference phenomenon" ... has
been defined in psychiatric practice as "a
phenomenon ... by which the patient transfers feeling toward everyone else to the doctor, who then must react with a proper
response, the countertransference, in order
to avoid emotional involvement and assist
the patient in overcoming problems." ... The
mishandling of this phenomenon, which generally results in sexual relations or involvement between the psychiatrist or therapist
and the patient, has uniformly been considered as malpractice or gross negligence in
other jurisdictions ... 49
46. P. RU'ITER, supra note 5, at 50 (emphasis added).
47. Id. See also A. STONE, LAw, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 199 (1984).
48. See Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140, 474 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. App. 1985)
(social worker); Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296,574 N.E.2d 602 (1991).
49. Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296, 574 N.E.2d 602, 607 (1991).
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In contrast, an Illinois appellate court has determined
that a divorce attorney who engages in a sexual relationship
with his female client does not breach his fiduciary obligation to
her. The court concluded that an attorney's relationship with his
client is distinguishable from that of a psychotherapist's because
no transference takes place in an attorney-client relationship. 60
Not all lawyers agree that transference does not occur in the
attorney-client relationship. Errol Zavett, a member of the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers/ 1 says regarding
attorney-client relationships: "There is considerable danger ...
of transference ... In a way, it is like psychiatrists whose
patients are in a vulnerable state. 52
Contrary to what the Illinois appellate courts may believe,
it is self-evident that in at least some attorney-client relationships transference will occur. I remember a conversation
I had with a successful local divorce attorney, during which he
told me that his secret to success was his total management of
every aspect of his female clients' lives. He said that they want
him to take control, so he does. What he described is a situation where transference is very likely to occur.
Since, unlike psychiatrists, attorneys are not trained to deal
with transference, it is all the more likely that they will mishandle it by engaging in sexual relationships with their clients.
This lack of training is a strong reason for a clear rule against
attorneys having sex with their clients. 53
50. Suppressed v. Suppressed, 206 Ill. App. 3d 918, 565 N.E.2d 101 (1990),
relJiew denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (1991). Accord Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363,
1366 (9th Cir. 1986) (where the court stated:
The crucial factor in the therapist-patient relationship which
leads to imposition of legal liability for conduct which
arguably is no more exploitative of a patient than sexual
involvement of a lawyer with a client, a priest or minister
with a parishioner, or a gynechologist with a patient is that
lawyers, ministers and gynecologists do not offer a course of
treatment and counseling predicated upon handling the
transference phenomenon.).
In other words, since this isn't in their job description, when it happens they aren't
responsible for it!
51. Errol Zavett served on a committee of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers which produced a document called "Bounds of Advocacy - Standards of
Conduct in Matrimonial Litigation." This publication is the source of a specific rule
prohibiting sexual relationships between divorce lawyers and their clients. Rule 216
provides: An attorney should never have a sexual relationship with a client or opposing counsel during the time of the representation. This rule has no disciplinary
effect and is aspirational only. Chicago B. Ass'n Report, supra note 22, at 10.
52. Wesniewski, supra note 24, at 12. See also Lyon, supra note 5 at 162-6.
53. Emotional damage is only one harm that a woman client may suffer from
having sex with her attorney. She also runs the risk of getting pregnant, as occurred
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A woman's harm differs from that of a man who has sex with
his attorney because of our culture's double standard concerning sex outside of marriage. As Professor Susan Estrich notes,
"Men with active sex lives are normal, desirable, successful.
Women are loose, easy, unworthy. Men are 'Don Juans'. Women
are whores."64 This perception affects how the woman client
views herself, how her attorney views her and, if their relationship comes to light, how society views her. It injures her.
In certain contexts the harm a woman can suffer from
attorney-client sex can be immeasurable. In the context of
divorce, a woman who has an affair with her divorce attorney
may lose custody of her children. This almost happened to the
woman in Lehr and Lehr.55 In that case, custody of their
young daughter was shifted to the father when the trial judge
learned that the mother was living with her lawyer. 56 The
father had not sought custody but rather had approached the
court about his duty to pay child support. The father acknowledged in his brief that after his wife left him, he moved to a religious center where he was paid wages of $5.00 per week. 67
He conceded he had had alcohol problems during their marriage, and that he was asked to leave the religious center
after five months for "not cooperating".68 At the time of this
appeal, he was earning $6.00 per month and was doing volunteer work for the Joys of Ministry, so that the child was
placed with a babysitter every day but Sunday and even
in Barbara A, contracting a venereal disease or even AIDS. Women are much more
likely to contract AIDS from a male sexual partner than vice versa. Heterosexual men
infected with AIDS are at least 17.5 times more likely to transmit the disease to women
through sex than the other way around. Ms., JanlFeb., 1992, at 76; the Eugene
Register·Guard, Sept. 25, 1991, at 6a.
If a woman has the extreme misfortune to hire a male attorney who is a sexual
predator, her risk of contracting venereal disease and AIDS are especially high. See
P. RUTTER, supra note 5, at 41 (noting "that most men who violate the forbidden zone
are so·called repeaters who serially exploit woman after woman."). One of the harms
that the woman in Doe v. Roe alleged she suffered from her sexual relationship with
her divorce attorney was the exposure to such risks. She alleged that "Roe engaged
in sexual relations with numerous sexual partners, including at 'swinger' parties, and
that posed an 'unusual risk' of life· threatening sexually transmitted infection." She
also alleged that it was Roe's "regular practice to attempt to persuade female divorce
clients that he found attractive to submit to his sexual demands." 756 F.Supp. 353,
356 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
54. Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 849 (1991). See D. MARsTON, supra
note 3, at 138-9 for a lurid account of an attorney who viewed his female client as a
whore.
55. 36 Or. App. 23, 583 P.2d 1157 (1978).
56. [d.

57. Appellant's Brief, Lehr v. Lehr, 36 Or. App. 23, 583 P.2d 1157 (1978).
58. [d.
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occasionally overnight. 59 Despite these facts, the trial judge's
outrage over the mother's decision to "live in sin" with her
lawyer led the judge to find that it was in the three year old
daughter's best interests to live with the father.6o
This case highlights the serious risks which attorney-client
sex poses to a client's interests in the divorce context. As
noted in the discussion section to Oregon Legal Ethics Opinion
No. 475 concerning the question of whether it is unethical for
a divorce lawyer to have sex with his client:
The lawyer representing one spou~e in a dissolution proceeding cannot know with certainty whether a reconciliation is possible or
is in the best interest of the client, or how the
possibility of reconciliation might be affected
by an affair between the lawyer and the client.
Nor can the lawyer know with certainty what
reaction the client's spouse would have to
learning that the lawyer is having an affair
during the dissolution proceedings, or how
such knowledge might affect the negotiation of
property rights and, if children are involved,
the right to custody.... The potential for prejudice to the client is immense. 61
Another example of the risks attorney-client sex poses in the
divorce court is set out in Doe v. Roe. 62 Here the woman client's
husband decided not to pay his wife's attorney fees once he discovered she was having sex with her lawyer. The financial risks
for women clients will often be substantially greater than
those of men clients since most women are significantly poorer than their soon-to-be ex-husbands. This also makes them
easy prey for a lawyer who views sex for services as an appropriate quid pro quo.
I spoke with Jeanne Metzger, the woman who brought the
$uppressed v. Suppressed suit against her divorce attorney for
the harm she suffered from her sexual encounters with him. In
59. rd.
60. The trial court's decision was reversed on appeal. Lehr v. Lehr, 36 Or. App.
23, 583 P.2d 1157 (1978).
61. Op. 475, supra note 21. See also Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, State B. CaL, Formal Op. 1987-92, cited in Nat'l Rptr. on Legal Ethics 35 n.8
(1988) [hereinafter Op. 1987-921; P. RUTTER, supra note 5, at 32-3.
62. 756 F. Supp. 353, 355 (N.D. Ill. 1991).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/3

16

Forell: Lawyers, Clients and Sex

1992]

LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND SEX

627

a written statement she describes what happened to her as
follows:
I had seen the Hansen [pseudonym] firm
featured on Phil Donahue Show, and also
featured in the local newspapers. They had
a reputation for representing women in
divorce cases, so I selected that firm precisely because I felt vulnerable and fearful
and wanted a lawyer I could depend on. Mr.
Hansen seemed to be a forceful and power-.
ful attorney.....
The first sexual encounter [occurred
when] Mr. Hansen instructed me to come
to his office on a Saturday. When I arrived,
there were file folders on all the chairs, leaving only one place for me to sit: a couch.
Mr. Hansen said, 'Just have a seat,' so I sat
down on the couch.
The events of the next few moments happened quickly.. First Mr. Hansen braced a
chair against the door, under the knob. I
couldn't believe my eyes. I was shocked and
speechless. He sat down next to me on the
couch, unzipped his pants, and forced my
head down into his lap, compelling me to
perform oral sex. He said, 'You don't have to
do this if you don't want to' - hardly an
accurate statement since I was no match
for him physically and was unable to free
myself from his grasp. After he released
his hold on me, I sat up. I was in a state of
shock and disbelief. I felt confused, humiliated and degraded. ... He couldn't have
had a more powerful effect on me if he had
held a gun to my head. 63
During our phone conversation Metzger told me that she
retained a new attorney after their third sexual encounter
because, while "some women barter that way" she wasn't one
ofthem. 64 She also said the power she felt her attorney had over
63. Statement of Jeanne Metzger (1989).
64. Telephone interview with Jeanne Metzger (Jan. 28, 1992).
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her because of the prospect oflosing her children made her feel
like she was "going out before a firing squad. "66
Similarly, a woman interviewed in Peter Rutter's book
descibed "the helplessness leading to psychic numbing that she
felt at the moment her attorney told her he would abandon a
lawsuit for her house unless she agreed to have sex."66 She said:
There is no way to control anything.
When this happens, there is no boundary to
the self. There is no self. Anybody can do
anything he wants to you. You have no
power, no control, no choice. You can't say
yes or no. 67
What must it feel like to undergo such an ordeal? The
betrayal of trust, fear of reprisal, the guilt and the shame are
injuries that I believe the law should recognize and compensate.
These experiences are women's experiences. What happened
to these women simply does not happen to men. 68
The only two cases I know of that involve a sexual relationship between a female attorney and a male client only
serve to further illustrate the difference in how society views
men and women's sexual conduct. The only reported case I
have located in which a woman attorney was disciplined for sexualization of an attorney-client relationship involved a criminal defense attorney and her client. In Committee on
Professional Ethics v. Durham,69 Leona Durham appealed her
65.Id.
66. P. RUTTER, supra note 5, at 153.
67. Id. See also Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gibson, 124 Wis. 2d 466, 469,
369 N.W.2d 695, 697 (1985) (When client Slane visited her attorney's office to discuss
obtaining a restraining order against her abusive husband her attorney "turned the
office lights otT, knelt beside Mrs. Slane's chair, began kissing her, put his hands inside
her blouse and fondled her breasts, and moved his hands over her pelvic area outside
her clothing. In order to stop him, Mrs. Slane told him she was visualizing being beaten and was frightened. ").
68. These women are being treated "as women." See MacKinnon, From Practice
to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J. OF LAW & FEMINISM 13, 15
(1991).
69. 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979). When I first heard about the Durham case I wondered why she was treated so harshly relative to the treatment of other lawyers who
are charged with much more serious sexual misconduct. When I looked at the actual case there was a shock of recognition. Leona Durham was the editor of the
University of Iowa's student newspaper, The Daily Iowan, when I was there as an
undergraduate in the late 1960's and early 1970's. I remember her as a very outspoken
person who was willing to take controversial stands. In my view her treatment by the
Iowa State Bar Association has something of a bad odor to it.
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one-year suspension from the practice of law to the Iowa
Supreme Court. The ethics committee had recommended her
suspension because she was seen kissing and embracing her
client during her visits with him at the state penitentiary.
There was no allegation that sexual intercourse took place
and the disciplinary proceedings were not initiated because of
dissatisfaction by Durham's client with her professional services. The supreme court determined by "a clear preponderance
of evidence" that Durham and her client "engaged in kissing
and embracing during the visits in question, as well as at
least occasionally caressing or fondling each other."70 (However,
the court failed to similarly find that Durham had "exposed a
breast for [her client's1 view. ")71 In light of these findings, the
Iowa Supreme Court determined that a one year suspension
was not merited; instead it publicly reprimanded Durham for
her conduct.
Durham's treatment by Iowa's ethics committee, a case
which involved no client complaint, stands in sharp contrast to
the treatment of male attorneys in California and Illinois.
Neither the California bar's handling of the complaints against
Marvin Mitchelson nor the Illinois bar's handling of the complaints against the unnameable attorney sued by two different
women in Suppressed and Doe has led to any discipline of these
men for their alleged sexual exploitation of numerous female
clients. 72 Two reasons for this come to mind. First, Durham's
conduct was public, while Mitchelson and Mr. Unnameable's
conduct took place behind closed doors. Second, Durham's
conduct was unladylike. The concept of a woman attorney publicly expressing her physical attraction to a convicted criminal
is disturbing. As the Durham court responded, "Sexual contact
with a client in a professional context ... is well outside that
which could be termed temperate and dignified. "73
Accordingly, the court held that Durham violated the ethical consideration calling upon a lawyer to be "temperate and
70. Id. at 282.
71. Id.
72. The Iowa Supreme Court suspended a male attorney for six months for
requesting sex in lieu of fees from a divorce client in Iowa State Bar v. Hill, No. 23·
99·1695 (Iowa, Nov. 22, 1989). Quid pro quo would appear to be much more serious
than failing to act in a dignified manner. See also Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Gibson, 124 Wis.2d 446, 473·4, 369 N.W.2d 695, 698-9 (1985) (court suspended attor·
ney for ninety days for sexually assaulting client and refused to consider testimony
of four former clients whom he had similarly sexually exploited).
73. 279 N.W.2d at 284.
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dignified." It also found that her behavior violated a disciplinary rule regarding conduct "that adversely reflects on his
[or her] fitness to practice law."7.
The openness of Durham's conduct was clearly an important
factor:
We are faced not with a question of private
sexual conduct by an attorney, but with conduct by an attorney who was at least appearing to function in her professional capacity.
We are thus unable to accept [Durham's]
argument that the incidents in question
were solely of a private nature between consenting adults. 76
Notably, the Iowa Supreme Court specifically distinguishes the first In re Wood 76 case on the grounds that the conduct
in Wood was "private."77 (Wood was the attorney who received
a one year suspension for his first proven offense of bartering
sex for services, and who was later disbarred for his second
proven offense involving similar conduct, this time with a
minor whom he forced to act as a pornographic model).78
Intriguingly, the only other case I have found where a
woman attorney's personal relationship with her client caused
a public outcry involved facts quite similar to those in Durham.
Oregon attorney Karen Steele was assigned to represent criminal defendant Frank Gable (who has since been convicted of
murdering Oregon Corrections Director Michael Francke).
Ms. Steele fell in love with Gable, and during her visits to him
in jail was witnessed "cuddling, laughing and holding hands"
with him. This made front page news in the Portland
Oregonian newspaper.79 When her conduct reached the public's
attention, her firm withdrew from its representation of Gable.
Steele resigned from the firm and married Gable. Here, no one
charged Steele with unethical conduct. However, her behavior was viewed as being sufficiently scandalous to merit extensive news coverage.
ld. at 285.
ld.
358 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. 1976).
279 N.W.2d at 285.
78. See supra note 8, and accompanying text.
79. Portland Oregonian, July 11, 1991.

74.
75.
76.
77.
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The double standards of society and of the Bar were hard
at work in these two cases. Compared with the conduct of male
attorneys who have sexualized their relationships with their
clients, the conduct of Durham and Steele is trivial, and not
even particularly newsworthy.
The persistent discounting by the judiciary and the Bar of
women clients' allegations of injury by the sexualization of the
attorney-client relationship are consistent with the male myth
of the "demon woman" seeking vengeance by destroying a
man's career. This myth emerges wherever there are allegations
and denials of sexual misconduct. As Professor Susan Estrich
points out in her book Real Rape: "Three centuries ago the
English Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale warned that rape is
a charge "easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho' never so innocent."80
The myth is that the woman, despite her demure appearance, actually desires the man to force her to have sex with him.
Presumably, after she has allowed herself to be seduced, her
feelings of guilt cause her to cry ~rape" or, in this context,
"breach of fiduciary duty". According to the myth the male is
an innocent victim of these female wiles and neuroses.S l
The truth, documented by numerous studies, is that the
number of false. allegations by women of sexual injuries is
incredibly small. A recent newspaper article on rapes in
80. S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 5 (1987) (citing SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, I (1971).
81. Men's fear of being falsely accused of sexual misconduct by obsessive and vindictive women permeates our culture. See, e.g., 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 459, 460 (3d
ed.1924):
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of
errant young girls and women coming before the courts in all
sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by a diseased
derangement or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social
environment, partly by temporary physical or emotional
conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual offenses by men. The unchaste
(let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression
in the narration ofimaginary sex - incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and convincing. The real victim,
however, too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the
respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a
wronged female helps give easy credit to such a plausible tale.
See also S. Freud, Lecture 33, Femininity, cited in J. STRACHEY, THE COMPLETE
INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS, 576 (1966).
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Portland, Oregon said: "Portland police think the number of
false reports [of rape] they receive is very small ... [I]n 1990 of
the 431 rape and attempted rape reports made to the Portland
police, 1.6% were determined to be unfounded. By comparison,
2.6% of the stolen vehicle reports were false or unfounded. s2
Similarly, Peter Rutter asserts that "[w ]hile there do exist
destructive women who try to coerce men into having sex or
who falsely accuse men of sexual exploitation, this is still a
miniscule problem compared to the actual abuse by men of forbidden-zone relationships. "S3
Nevertheless, the legal system is obsessed with the perceived danger of the false accusation. In Suppressed u.
Suppressed s4 one reason given for refusing to allow an action
against a divorce attorney by his client for the emotional harm
she claimed resulted from her sexual relationship with him was
that "[t]he potential for abuse would be too great."S6 The
judges were concerned that imposing liability for such conduct
would chill the attorney-client relationship because of the
"grave potential" for such a suit "to be used for blackmail by
unscrupulous persons seeking unjust enrichment. "S6 These
"unscrupulous persons" are, of course, those vindictive and conniving women the myth describes.
A similar concern was raised by the dissenting opinion in
a case in which a majority of the Illinois Supreme Court
allowed a malpractice action to go forward against an unlicensed psychologist for having sex with his client. The dissent
in Corgan u. Mueling S7 protested that "[t]o hold the defendant
legally liable under such conditions is to countenance a legal
form of extortion or blackmail." He concluded his opinion:
82. Sunday Oregonian, Jan. 5, 1992, at A-11, cols. 1,2.
83. P. RUTTER, supra note 5, at 164.
84. 206 Ill. App. 3d 918, 565 N.E.2d 101 (1990).
85. 1d. at 923, 565 N.E.2d at 106.
86. 1d. at 923 n.3, 565 N.E.2d at 106 n.3. What do courts fear when they suggest
that liability for injuries arising out of attorney-client sex may "chill" the attorneyclient relationship? Are they concerned that an attorney will be deterred from counseling clients? From holding their hands? The court in Barbara A. was also worried
about this issue: "To hold otherwise would have a chilling and far reaching effect on
any personal relationship between an attorney and his or her clients." 145 Cal. App.
3d 369, 379,193 Cal. Rptr., 422, 432-3 (1983) (denying the usual presumption of undue
influence because the case involved the attorney~client relationship). Why don't most
courts have the same concern about the chilling effect of liability for psychotherapistpatient sex?
87. 574 N.E.2d 602, 611 (Ill. 1991).
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"The plaintiff, having willingly engaged in a frolic, now seeks
to use the legal system as a tool for a shakedown."88
Joseph DuCanto, who practices family law and also teaches at law schools in Chicago, opposes a rule barring attorneyclient sex because such a rule "makes male lawyers extremely,
extremely vulnerable to ugly kinds of charges that have little
or no substance." He adds, "That's not to say every woman who
complains her lawyer put his hand on her breast is to be disbelieved. But believe me, there are a lot of wackos out there
who will do anything to save a few bucks. "89 But why should
we believe him, when the facts tell us the opposite? And why
do so many people, both male and female, continue to believe
that women who allege that they were sexually exploited
behind closed doors are either liars or psychopaths?90
Further evidence that the law views sex with one's client
from a male perspective can be derived from those cases
against psychotherapists who engage in sexual relations with
their clients, where the person seeking recovery for injuries is
not the woman client who had sex with her therapist but is
instead her husband. The courts find that injuries to these husbands are very real indeed. Breach of fiduciary obligations
and/or professional malpractice are found if the husband was
also a client of the therapist. 91 And even if the husband was not
a client, he can still claim intentional infliction of emotional distress. 92
Two nearly identical cases in Illinois suggest that the
wrong the courts are willing to redress can be defined as
88. Id. at 612.
89. Gill & Holt, supra note 22, at 60.
90. See Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, (Book
Review), 41 STAN. L. REV. 751 (1989) (analyzing Catherine MacKinnon's feminist
method that is based on "believing women's accounts of sexual use and abuse by men.·
C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 5 (1987». As Professor Littleton points out, the
concept of believing women's accounts about sexual abuse is a radical idea. The recent
HilllThomas hearings and Smith (Kennedy) rape trial highlight the reality that
women who allege that a powerful man sexually exploited her in private will rarely
be believed.
91. See, e.g., Richard H. v. Larry D., 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807
(1988); Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 585 A.2d 69 (Md. Ct. App. 1991); Anclote Manor
Foundation v. Wilkinson, 263 So.2d 256 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972); Andrews v. United
States, 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984).
92. Spiess v. Johnson, 89 Or. App. 289, 294, affd memo by an equally divided court,
307 Or. 242, 765 P.2d 811 (1988).
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meddling with another man's property. In Horak v. Biris 93 a
husband sued a social worker for engaging in sexual relations
with his wife during marital counseling. The Illinois appellate
court found that the social worker breached his fiduciary duty,
and that "any malpractice committed by the defendant in the
treatment of plaintiff's wife [who was not a party to the suit]
would clearly have an impact upon plaintiff as well. "94 The
court allowed the cuckolded husband to recover damages for his
emotional distress and even for loss of consortium. In contrast,
an Illinois appellate court just three years earlier held that a
woman could not recover for the emotional harm she suffered
from her husband having sexual relations with his social
worker during marital counseling. In her case, no breach of
fiduciary duty was found. The Horak court acknowledged that
the facts of Martino v. Family Service Agency ofAdams County 96
were virtually indistinguishable from those of Horak. The
only distinction the Horak court found was that the plaintiff
in Martino had not alleged "mishandling of transference" in her
complaint. 96 The judges in Horak failed to mention the more
obvious difference between the cases: Horak involved a man's
proprietary interest in his wife's sexuality while Martino did
not.
V.

WOMEN ATTORNEYS WHO SUPPORT THE STATUS QUO

While many women attorneys support the adoption of a rule
banning attorney-clients, there are also many women attorneys
who oppose such a rule. When the Oregon Board of Bar
Governors brought a no-sex-with-clients rule to the membership for a vote in October of 1991, some of the most outspoken
opponents of the rule were women. For example, one woman
said:
I oppose this motion. I think it invades our
right to privacy. The existing disciplinary
rules and opinions take care of this. This
new proposal is stricter than the [proposed]
California rule, and it's totally unnecessary.
Let's preserve our right to privacy. Our
93. 130 Ill. App. 3d 140,474 N.E.2d 13 (1985).
94. Id. at 145,474 N.E.2d at 18.
95. 112 Ill. App. 3d 593, 445 N.E.2d 6 (1982). At least as ofl988, Martino was
the only appellate case involving a female psychotherapist and her sexual relationship with a male client. See LeBoeuf, supra note 3, at 84 n.7.
96. 130 Ill. App. 3d at 145, 474 N.E.2d at 19.
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current rules are sufficient. Let's leave it
that way.97
One of the California Board of Bar Governors who opposed
an outright ban on attorney/client sex was Catherine Sprinkles
who was concerned that the bar's ethical rules not be "a mechanism for the State Bar to impose moral views on the public. "9S
A female member of California Young Lawyers Association
who commented on the proposed California rule was reported
to have said that "many single lawyers would have to revert to
celibacy if they couldn't consort with their clients, as long as
it didn't affect their legal representation. "99
What I hear these women say concerning attorney-client sex
is that we need to protect the personal rights and needs of attorneys. What I don't hear them expressing is concern for the
rights and interests of their clients.
Considering the strong evidence that most people who suffer serious injury from sex with their attorneys are women, why
are so many women attorneys unwilling to endorse a rule to
prevent their brother attorneys from harming other women? I
would hope the reason is unawareness of the magnitude and
extent of the harm caused by attorney-client sex. I fear, however, that also operating is a desire to protect their membership in the "club."
97. Transcript of 1991 Annual Business Meeting, Or. State B. Ass'n, Oct. 4, 1991,
at 140 [hereinafter Transcript].
Another woman attorney also spoke out against the rule. She said:
I think it is an inappropriate recommendation. It's an intrusion into consenting adults doing something that is legal. It
is not the same as a prohibition of taking your clients' property.... It reminds me a little bit of the theology some years
ago. Is this DR now the mortal sin, and we're going to put
(inaudible) in the ethical considerations because it's not
covered in it. I mean, look at the kind of intrusion we are
making into private lives. I come from a fairly conservative
theological history, but to me this is a throwback to Salem
and the witch hunts and the puritan stock. And it is unacceptable to interfere in people's private lives.
[d. at 154.
98. The Recorder, Jan. 29,1991, at 3. Another woman attorney member of the
California Board of Bar Governors, Claudia Carver, said, "any rule would be intrusive
and' would pose constitutional questions.". [d.
99. L.A. Times, Aug. 28, 1991, § A, at 3, col. 2. She was also quoted as saying:
"I work 12 hours a day, and I only meet lawyers and clients. And 1 wouldn't have sex
with another lawyer, that's for sure: (She wouldn't have sex with other lawyers but
it's fine for the clients to have sex with them?)
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Catherine MacKinnon wrote a scathing attack titled "On
Collaboration" against the women attorneys who opposed the
ordinance proposed by her and Andrea Dworkin to make the
sale of pornography actionable as sex discrimination. She
made the following comment, which I find also applicable to the
attorney-client sex issue: "It's even more frustrating to have
women lawyers, feminists, say or act as though it doesn't happen - or if it does, that it is not as important as the pleasure to
be gotten from it. "100 MacKinnon also said:
To be a lawyer orients you to power, probably sexually as well as in every other way.
The law has a historical hostility to new
ideas, hurt women, and social change. But
more than that, we were let into the profession on the implicit condition what we
would enforce the real rules: women kept
out and down, sexual access to women
enforced ... It keeps the value of the most
exceptional women high to keep other
women out and down on their backs with
their legs spread ... What law school does for
you is this: it tells you that to become a
lawyer means to forget your feelings, forget
your community, most of all, if you are a
woman, forget your experience. 101
MacKinnon's message is controversial, but also very powerful. Women attorneys should keep her message in mind as
they consider their position on the issue of attorney-client
sexual relationships.I02
100. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 202 (1987). "On Collaboration" was
based on a speech that was part of a debate at the National Conference of Women and
the Law in New York, Mar. 24, 1985.
101. ld. at 205. MacKinnon concluded: "I want you to stop claiming your liberalism, with its elitism, and your Freudianism, with its sexualized misogyny, has
anything in common with feminism." ld.
102. Opposition to an attorney-client ethical rule actually goes against the
interests of many women attorneys. Young women associates in large firms are not
infrequently propositioned by their male business clients. The power in these situations is actually wielded by the clients. The women associates are vulnerable
because their firms do not want to alienate valuable clients. An ethical rule against
attorney-client sex would be one reason these women could give their clients for
refusing their sexual advances.
This dilemma for women associates was discussed at a sexual harassment
workshop which was part of a conference on Feminist Jurisprudence held at Lewis &
Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon on April 19, 1991. Many of the women participating
described problems with their business clients sexually pressuring them and
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VI. WHY A RULE BANNING ATTORNEY-CLIENT SEX
WOULD BENEFIT LAWYERS.
Lawyers have a bad public image. A Gallup poll ranked
attorneys just below funeral directors in public esteem. lOS A
national survey by the Consumer Research Center reported
that almost half those responding rated lawyers services and
fees as poor, one of the study's lowest ratings. 104
Lawyers' public refusal to regulate their personal behavior
which may affect their professional behavior does nothing to
improve the public's low regard. While conducting research for
this paper I found a 1919 Oregon Supreme Court opinion in
which Judge Bennett, in his dissent to the majority's failure to
find a breach of fiduciary duty by an attorney (not involving sexual conduct), spoke to both the issue of attorneys' obligations
to the public and the low public esteem in which attorneys are
held. The following, which Judge Bennett wrote in response to
the majority's strong language about an attorney's obligations
to his client, is perhaps even more on point today:
These are brave, strong words, and with
every syllable of them I entirely concur.
They fix the duty of an attorney toward his
client at a high standard - but not too high,
when we consider the peculiarly confidential
relation which an attorney enjoys; and the
fact, that those with whom he deals ... are
generally ignorant of the law, and of their
legal rights; and practically at the mercy of
the lawyer who represents them. Such a
declaration of the principles which govern
attorneys, will be an inspiration to the
lawyer who cares deeply for his profession
and for its honor. When it becomes generally known, that this is the standard which
governs the conduct of attorneys - and that
the courts unflinchingly carry the principles so declared into execution - there will be
the lack of support from their law firms for their predicament. Conversation with
Professor Mary Wood, February 11, 1992 and telephone conversation with Professor
Kristine Rogers, February 28, 1992.
103. Rymer, High Road, Low Road: Legal Professicn at Crossroads, Trial
Magazine, Oct. 1989, at 79.
104. [d.
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an end to that unjust belief, unfortunately
now so general among laymen, that lawyers
are mercenary and unscrupulous grafters;
and that the courts, being composed of
lawyers promoted, look with complacent tolerance, and winking eye, upon unjust greed
and rapacity of their erstwhile associates. l06
Judge Bennett's words reflect my beliefs about how lawyers
are perceived and why they are perceived this way. I believe
that the public in general and attorneys' clients in particular
will view a refusal to adopt a rule on attorney-client sex as
purely self-serving and self-protecting. l06 The fact that the
California legislature enacted a statute mandating that such
a rule be in effect by January of 1991, despite which the
California Supreme Court still has not promulgated it, makes
the legal profession look bad. Lawyers' protestations about privacy and association freedoms are downright embarrassing. An
unidentified speaker in favor of the proposed rule against
attorney-client sex at the Oregon Bar Convention said: "I
would suggest to you that the arguments being made against
this resolution would fool only a lawyer. It will not fool our
clients. It will not fool the members of the public. It is fine to
take the sex out of the business of providing legal services. "107
The public's view oflawyers is based on actual experience,
which I hope is positive, and what they see, read and hear about
lawyers. The public watches "L.A. Law"108 and reads about
Marvin Mitchelson. For the public, the conduct of Arnie
Becker and Marvin Mitchelson is conduct that the bar association condones. And it is hard to argue that this is not true.
Although we do have rules that may be applied to lawyerclient sex when such conduct creates a conflict ofinterest l09 or
threatens competent representation llo , these rules are rarely
105. Kirchoffv. Bertstein, 92 Or. 378, 413, 181 P. 746 (1919) (Bennett, J., dissenting).
106. As Victor McCarthy, a public member of the California Board of Bar
Governors said: "The Bar has a real opportunity to enhance its credibility with the
public, and the Bar is sorely in need of that enhancement." The Recorder, Jan. 29, 1991,
at 3.
107. Transcript, supra note 97, at p. 136.
108. "L.A. Law" broadcast a show on the ethics of attorney-client sex. In it Arnie
Becker, the randy divorce lawyer, was publicly humiliated when he was pointedly
grilled on whether his own behavior with women clients was ethical or not. L.A. Law
(NBC television broadcast, Jan. 30, 1992).
109. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310.
110. 1d.
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enforced in this setting. And far too many lawyers think the
whole idea of restricting attorney-client sex is simply ajoke. ll1
AI Martinez' article in the Los Angeles Times on March 28,1991
described a conversation between two lawyers which he overheard in a courthouse elevator: "One of them was saying it was
nobody's business who, as he put it, his "sexual co-habitant"
was .... Lawyer No.2 replied that it wasn't so much whether
they should have sex with clients, but whether they should
charge them for the time it takes to achieve satisfaction."112
Possibly this anecdote would be amusing if the writer's
message did not contain an unpleasant truth about the way
some lawyers think. The truth is, some lawyers not only have
sex with their clients, but charge them sizeable fees for these
"professional" services. The word for this practice is prostitution. lls John of Barbara A. u. John G. fame may have been
guilty of this. So may have Albert Brooks Friedman, if what
his former client, Sherry Kantar, alleges in In re Marriage of
Kantar 114 is true. Ms. Kantar appealed the summary judgment
in favor of Friedman's firm for $16,392.17 in attorneys' fees
arising from Friedman's representation of her in her divorce
proceedings. She objected to paying this sum partly because
111. Melvin Belli claims attorney-client sex is the "lawyer's prerogative." State
Bar Struggles With Ethics of Lawyer-Client Sex, S.F. Examiner, Aug. 4,1986 at A-4,
col. 1.
112. Martinez, Sex and Law, L.A. Times, Mar. 28, 1991, § B, at 2, col. 5.
Martinez also described other attorney's reactions:
An attorney I spoke with named Max winked and said any
client who had sex with him would emerge not only with vastly increased trust and reliance but also with awesome respect.
A woman attorney, Beverly, suggests that lawyers be furnished with a card they could hand a client before the sex act
takes place. Such a card would contain wording similar to
that in the Miranda Rule, which advises suspects of their
right to remain silent, etc., In this case, it would be the
right not to have sex with one's lawyer and warn of the
potential for problems thereafter.
Actually, Beverly's flippant suggestion is basically the rule in Oregon for divorce
lawyers. See Or. Board of Governors, Formal Op. 1991-99, infra note 133 and accompanying text.
113. An attorney was disciplined when he was on the receiving end of prostitution in exchange for his legal services in In re Howard, 297 Or. 174 (1984). His client
had been arrested for prostitution. Howard received a public reprimand because
"[iJn payment for Howard's legal fee he and the woman engaged in sexual conduct."
Id. at 177.
114. 581 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1991). See also McDaniel v. Gile, 230
Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991) (client cross-complained for sexual harassment after her attorney sued for his fees).
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"she and Friedman engaged in sexual relations at least 20
times prior to the entry of the judgment of dissolution [and]
legal fees were billed for time during which [Kantar] and
Friedman engaged in sexual relations and for personal telephone calls to her...."116 The Illinois appellate court reversed the
summary judgment, but dodged the attorney-client sex issue.1I6

It is an embarrassment to the legal profession that an
attorney would charge a client for his sexual services and go
unpunished. It is downright mortifying that the Illinois
Supreme Court appointed Friedman to the committee on character and fitness of the State Board of Law Examiners after this
suit had been filed.117 The Attorney General of Oregon, Charles
Crookham, speaking about the proposed rule against attorneyclient sex at the Oregon State Bar Convention (prior to being
appointed attorney genera!), mentioned the suit against
Friedman and his appointment by the Illinois Supreme Court
as an example of our present sad state of affairs. This example was not enough to persuade the attorney voters who
nonetheless rejected the rule. However, it did evoke laughter
from the attorney audience. liS
Some attorneys argue that we already have too many rules.
However, a rule against attorney-client sex will not cause a
flood of complaints or baseless charges of ethical violations. 119
As discussed earlier, false reports of sexual injuries are
extremely rare. 120 Virtually the only people likely to raise
these matters with the bar are women clients who actually were
sexually exploited by their attorneys. And moreover, these
claims will meet with the great difficulty of proving sexual relations occurred at all, if, as is likely, the attorney does not
admit this.121 In California the standard the Bar must meet to
115. Id. at 9.
116. The court concluded: MThe issue whether the alleged sexual relationship
breached the attorney's fiduciary duty also is not reached because the alleged attorney fees' impropriety alone would be a sufficient reason, if proven, to vacate the
judgment." Id. at 11. But see the concurrence discussed infra note 254.
117. Gill & Holt, supra note 24, at 10.
118. Transcript, supra note 97, at 141.
119. Some critics will respond that this is just their point. The problem is not a
serious one and can be adequately dealt with under the present rules. My response
is that the bar's refusal to specifically acknowledge that this is a problem is wrong both
morally and from a public perception perspective. The Bar should take a public
stand on this issue because it's the right thing to do. The present more general
rules do not adequately do this.
120. See supra notes 80, 81 and accompanying text.
121. Chicago B. Ass'n Report, supra note 22, at 8, 14.
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prove a sexual relationship existed is clear and convincing
evidence of reasonable certainty.122 If the woman client can
meet this heavy burden of proof, attorneys should be concerned about her claim. Proven sexual predators should not be
allowed to practice law.
Another argument against a rule prohibiting attorney/client
sex is that it will not be effective against the sexual predator.
While it is true to a certain extent (it may not deter his sexual conduct), he will be stopped from preying on his clients ifhe
is disbarred from practice. Most importantly, a bright line rule
will provide notice to attorneys who are not sexual predators
but simply lack judgment or awareness of the harm that sex
with their clients can cause. The rule will also provide an attorney who feels he is being seduced with a sound reason to
refuse his client's advances. 123
When I told a professor friend of mine from another discipline that I was writing about the ethics of attorney/client
sex, her response was to say that everything lawyers do is
unethical. When I mentioned this topic to one of my students,
he responded that as an undergraduate he took a course in
political science where half the semester was spent reaching
the conclusion that the sole purpose of the American Bar
Association Rules is public relations. That intelligent people
hold these views about about lawyers deeply troubles me. But
lawyers' refusal to even try to improve their public image
bothers me more. A number of attorneys in Oregon are angry
with the Board of Bar Governors for proposing a rule against
attorney-client sex, complaining that when the rule was voted
down, attorneys were made to look bad. As one person speaking out against the rule said, it placed attorneys "in a damned
if we do and damned if we don't position ... by the fact that the
resolution has been submitted for our consideration. "124 The
question remains: how would ethical lawyers have been
damned by the public if they did adopt such a rule?
122. The Recorder, Apr. 23, 1991, at 1. The Oregon Bar's burden of proof is similarlyonerous. As the Oregon Supreme Court noted in In re Wolf, 312 Or. 655, 657
(1992). MThe Bar has the burden of establishing ethical misconduct by clear and con·
vincing evidence."
123. This could prove particularly useful for women attorneys as a means offend·
ing off amorous clients. See, e.g., Gill & Holt, supra note 22, at 59 (for examples of other
techniques used by women attorneys). See also supra note 100.
124. Transcript, supra note 89, at 149.
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Many lawyers just don't "get it." This issue is not about
their rights. It is about the rights and interests of their
clients. 126
In the end we return to what Judge Bennett said about
lawyers and the public in 1919. If attorneys do adopt a rule prohibiting attorney-client sex, "[w]hen it becomes generally
known, that this is the standard that governs the conduct of
attorneys - and that the courts unflinchingly carry the principles so declared into execution - there will be an end of the
unjust belief, ... that lawyers are mercenary and unscrupulous
grafters. "126
VI.
A.

THE OREGON AND CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES
OREGON

I will now briefly summarize the Oregon and California
bars' treatment of the sex-with-clients controversy over the past
few years. Oregon is especially interesting because it is the only
state to ever attempt to voluntarily to restrict its members' conduct. Oregon continues to be the most progressive state on this
issue, despite the defeat of a rule making attorney-client sex
per se unethical in October 1991.
Oregon's first attempt to specifically regulate attorneyclient sex was partly a reaction to the 1978 decision, Lehr
and Lehr 127 , discussed earlier. The Board of Governors
addressed the problem of attorney-client sex in the divorce context by issuing Legal Ethics Opinion No. 429 in 1979. In this
opinion, the Board concluded it was per se unethical for an
attorney to be sexually involved with a client if he was representing her in a divorce proceeding except "where there are no
children and [there is] an amicable settlement, or a default proceeding."128 The basis for finding the conduct unethical was DR
5-101(A) which requires that an attorney not represent a
client if the exercise of his professional judgment might be
125. When California State Bar President Charles B. Vogel said in the L.A
Times (L.A. Times, Jan. 21, 1991, Section A, at 3, col. 5)"1 have not had one single
lawyer call or write me about this issue-and if this were really an important prob·
lem, 1 think we'd have had a lot of communications," 1 say to myself: he doesn't get it.
126. Kirschoffv. Bernstein, 92 Or. 378, 413, 181 P. 746 (1919).
127. 36 Or. App. 23, 583 P.2d 1157 (1978) (discussed supra notes 53·8 and
accompanying text.
128. Or. Board of Governors, Legal Ethics Op., 429, at 446 (withdrawn June,
1982).
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affected by his personal interest, unless the client consents after
full disclosure. 129
This opinion was quite radical for its time. However, the
exception it granted to the per se rule caused a public outcry.
For example, the National Law Journal commented, "The
Oregon Bar Association has been taking a lot of heat for its ...
ethics opinion that says it's OK for a lawyer to have sex with
a client in certain instances. m3o
Public pressure led the Board of Governors to withdraw No.
429 and issue ethics opinion No. 475 on this issue in 1982. This
opinion declared attorney-client sex in the divorce context to
be a per se unethical in all cases. This remains the strongest
position any bar association has taken on attorney-client sex.
The opinion contains some very sensible language:
The attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary relationship, one of trust. The nature
of that fiduciary relationship tends to make
the client intellectually and, in many cases,
emotionally dependent upon the attorney.
If the client becomes involved in a love affair
with the attorney, that dependency would
only be increased. It would appear impossible for the lawyer to carryon such an affair
with the client and maintain an independent judgment about whether the affair
might harm the client's interests .... Even if
the attorney were able to predict the consequences of the affair and explain them to
the client, it is doubtful that the client's consent to the attorney's continued representation could ever be deemed truly informed
and voluntary (emphasis added).131
This opinion recognizes and comes to terms with the problem of transference, at least in a divorce setting. It remains the
national high water mark for restricting attorney-client sexual relations. 132
129. P. JARVIS, S. MOORE, J. SAPIRO, OREGON RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY ANNOTATED 75 (O.L.I. 1988).
130. In Flux, Nat'l L. J., Aug. 2, 1982.
131. Op. 475, supra note 21, at 510.
132. I know of no Oregon case presented to the ethics committee that specifically
would be covered by this advisory opinion. The only opinion concerning attorney-client
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After Oregon Legal Ethics Opinion No. 475 was issued,
public concern about attorney-client sex died down in Oregon
as well as nationally. Only in the 1990's did the issue return
to the forefront of national attention because of publicity about
attorney sexual misconduct in Illinois and California. Ironically,
in the process of reviewing its older ethical opinions, the
Oregon Board of Governors replaced No. 475 with Formal
Opinion No. 1991-99, which is somewhat weaker. The new
opinion provides that an attorney may have sex with his client
during divorce proceedings as long as the disclosure and consent requirements of DR 5-101(A) are satisfied. This is close
to a per se rule because full disclosure for DR 5-101 purposes
requires both that the attorney recommend that the client
"seek independent legal advice to determine if consent should
be given" and that "[fJull disclosure shall be contemporaneously
confirmed in writing. "133 The effect such disclosure would
have would likely be to deter most sexual relationships.
sex published during the period this opinion was in effect was In re Ofelt, 1 D.B. Rptr
22 (1985) in which the Oregon Supreme Court ordered Ofelt to be suspended from practice for 60 days because ofa conflict of interest with one of his business clients, a married couple, as a result of his having an affair with the wife. Ofelt admitted that his
sexual relationship with the wife client affected his professional judgment. However
in his answer to the complaint he claimed he was the one who was harmed:
The accused concedes that his judgment may have been
impaired by his affair with Sally Johnson, but denies that the
Johnsons were harmed by his actions. His efforts were
undertaken to improve the Johnsons' business, at a time
when they were struggling, and were done with their consent
and encouragement. The affair placed a great amount of
stress on the accused, but it did not cause him to do anything
in connection with the business which was detrimental to the
Johnsons' interest. If anything, the accused was influenced
to enter into a business under terms that were unfavorable
to himself. As a result the accused lost money, got sued, and
has had to undergo counseling with a psychiatrist.
Id. at 40-41.
The only other published opinion concerning attorney-client sex in Oregon was
decided very recently and again did not involve a divorce attorney. See In re Wolf, 312
Or. 655 (1992) (male personal injuries attorney had sexual intercourse with his 16year old female client).
133. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 10-101(B) (1980). It
would be entertaining to try to draft the written consent form that would be necessary
for ethical attorney-client sex.
DR 10-101(B) was modified slightly at the Oregon State Bar Convention on
October 4, 1991. It now says:
(B) (1) "Full disclosure" means an explanation sufficient to
apprise the recipient of the potential adverse impact on the recipient, of the matter to which the recipient is asked to consent.
(2) As used in DR 5-101 ... "full disclosure" shall also include
a recommendation that the recipient seek independent legal
advice to determine if consent should be given and shall be
contemporaneously confirmed in writing.
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The change from No. 475 to No. 1991-99 was based on the
advice of Portland attorney Peter Jarvis, an expert on legal
ethics. l34 Some members of the Board of Governors wanted to
retain an absolute per se opinion, but Jarvis advised them that
Oregon's ethical rules in their present form would not support such
an interpretation. A rule specifically restricting attorney-client
sex would be necessary to support an opinion like No. 475. 136
In response to Jarvis' advice, the Board of Governors formed
a subcommittee to examine the possibility of drafting a rule
specifically addressing attorney-client sex. The Board unanimously endorsed a rule making all attorney-client sex a per se
ethical violation except where the client was a spouse, a partner in a preexisting sexual relationship, or a peripheral employee of a business-entity client. 136 This proposed rule was debated
A personal injuries attorney was recently found to have violated former DR 5101(A) where he had sexual intercourse with his 16-year old client. In II'!. re Wolf, 312
Or. 655, 661 (1992), the Oregon Supreme Court held that even though sexual intercourse did not occur until after a settlement agreement had been reached, an attorney-client relationship continued because "the proceeds of the settlement had not been
distributed." (After the case was settled for $200,000, the attorney and his client rode
around town in a limousine, and had sexual intercourse in the back seat.) The court
found that the attorney had a personal interest in the case, noting that "before the settlement had been approved by the court, [the attorney] realized he had developed a
strong sexual interest in the girl, and she in him." ld. The court also found that the
exercise of the attorney's "professional judgment on his client's behalf reasonably might
have been affected by his personal interest." Therefore, informed consent was required,
and the court concluded that the client's consent to sexual intercourse "does not
amount to informed consent to ... continuing representation." ld.
134. Telephone interview with Peter Jarvis, Jan. 31, 1992.
135. ld.
136. Proposed rule DR 5-110 provided:
(A) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a current
client or representative of a current client.
(B) This rule shall not apply where the sexual relations are
between spouses or began prior to the establishment of the
lawyer-client relationship and where the lawyer's professional judgment is not or reasonably will not be affected by
the sexual relationship.
(C) For purposes oftMs rule "sexual relations" means:
(1) sexual intercourse; or
(2) any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts
of a person or causing such person to touch the sexual
or other intimate parts of the actor for the purpose of
arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party.
(D) For purposes of this rule "representative of a client"
means a principal, an employee, an officer or a director of a
client:
(1) Who provides the client's lawyer with information
that was acquired during the course of, or as a result
of, such person's relationship with the client a.s principal, employee, officer or director and is provided to the
lawyer for the purpose of obtaining for the client the
legal advice or other legal services of the lawyer; or
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and voted on at the Business Meeting of the Oregon State
Bar on October 4, 1991. Jeff Sapiro, the Oregon State Bar's disciplinary counsel, noted during the debate over the rule that
there were approximately six complaints concerning attorney-client sex currently under investigation by the Bar. He said
that the existing rules were adequate in some cases, such as
where criminal conduct had occurred. However, he noted that
a specific rule was the best mechanism for dealing with attorney-client sex.I37 Despite his testimony, and the unanimous
endorsement of the Board of Governors, the rule was rejected
by a margin of 139 to 107 attorney voters.
One reason the rule failed to pass was that a number of
attorneys thought it was too complicated and ambiguous. As
a result, the present status of attorney-client sex in Oregon is
that the general rules may be applied to appropriate cases but
only in the divorce setting is there the specific guidance provided by Formal Opinion No. 1991-99, discussed earlier.I3s
The Board of Governors may propose a different specific rule
in the future, but no such action has been taken so far.I39
The proposed rule and its rejection by the membership
received widespread publicity. For example, the Portland
Oregonian reported: "The debate over lawyer-client sex relationships was the sexiest and generated the most bad jokes at
the bar convention, but as one lawyer lamented: 'We're doing
all kinds of important things here but what gets all the attention is lawyers and sex."'140 Possibly that's because the public
thinks that the issue of lawyers and sex is important.

B.

CALIFORNIA

In contrast to the Oregon bar's self-initiated consideration of the issue of attorney-client sex, the California bar has
had the issue imposed upon it by the legislature. In 1989, in
reaction to the widely publicized scandal involving divorce
(2) Who as part of such person's relationship with the
client as principal, employee, officer or director, seeks,
receives or applies legal advice from the client's lawyer.
137. Transcript, supra note 97, at 148. One attorney who opposed the proposed
rule remarked: "I do represent my wife from time to time. We have a lot of dogs and
cats in our bedroom. I'd rather not have JefTSapiro there too." Portland Oregonian,
Oct. 5, 1991, § A, at 14.
138. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
139. Se%-With-Client Ban Fails, A.B.A. J. Feb. 1992, at 24.
140. Lawyer-client se% rule defeated, Portland Oregonian, Oct. 5, 1991, § A, at 14.
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Marvin Mitchelson's alleged rapes of some of his clients, state
assemblywoman Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-Los Angeles) began
her successful campaign for the legislature to enact a statute
mandating that the California Bar Association adopt an ethical rule with the approval of the California Supreme Court that
would specifically govern attorney-client sexual relations. 141 On
September 29,1989, this bill was signed by the Governor 142 and
became section 6106.8 of the California Business and
Professions Code. It required that the Bar submit a rule to the
Supreme Court "no later than January 1, 1991."143
Despite this mandate, the Bar did not adopt its proposed
rule until April 20, 1991 (by an 18-4 vote),144 The supreme
court sent the rule back to the State Board of Bar Governors
in late August of 1991 for the Board to obtain additional
comments from attorneys and the public. 145 In a letter dated
August 26, 1991 the court ordered the Bar to begin a 90-day
public comment period, focusing on the paragraph in the
proposed rule creating a presumption of ethical misconduct
where attorney-client sex is proven. 148 At the end of the 90day period the Bar again forwarded their proposed rule to the
supreme court along with the comments they received. 147 If
the supreme court refuses to approve the rule, the California
Legislature has a bill pending which will enact the proposed
rule as a statute. 148
Unlike the per se rule which Oregon attorneys rejected in
October 1991, if an attorney-client sexual relationship is
proven, the California rule creates only a rebuttable
presumption of incompetent representation. 149 Placing the
141. L.A. Times, Apr. 21, 1991, § A, at 3, col. 1.
142. B. Governors Memorandum, supra note 10, at 2.
143. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6106.8 (West 1989).
144. L.A. Times, Apr. 21, 1991, § A, at 3, col. 1.
145. L.A. Times, Aug. 28, 1991, § A, at 3, col. 2.
146. ld.
147. Presentation by Henry Contreras, Chief Consultant to Assemblywoman
Lucille Roybal-Allard, Feb. 8, 1992, Golden Gate University School of Law, San
Francisco.
148. The California Assembly has already approved it 73-0. ld.
149. Proposed rule 3-120 states:
(A) For purposes of this rule, "sexual relations" means sexual intercourse or the touching of an intimate part of another person for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.
(B) A member shall not:
(1) Require or demand sexual relations with a client
incident to or as a condition of any professional representation; or
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burden of proof on the attorney to rebut with a showing that
he has competently represented his client is what appears to
be bothering the California Supreme Court. ISO Why is this a
problem? Does the court think lawyers need greater procedural
protection than do psychotherapists when they have sex with
their clients?161 It will be interesting to see what the court finally does in reaction to the statutory mandate and Board of
Governors' recommended rule.
If nothing further transpires in California on the issue of
attorney-client sex, the California bar is left with some
limited guidance in the form of the Barbara A. v. John G.162 and
McDaniel v. Gile 163 decisions and Formal Ethics Opinion No.
1987-92.
Barbara A., discussed earlier,IM makes it clear that attorneys' fiduciary duty to their clients is not limited to dealings
(2) Employ coercion, intimidation, or undue influence in entering into sexual relations with a client; or
(3) Continue representation of a client with whom
the member has sexual relations if such sexual relations cause the member to perform legal services
incompetently in violation ofrule 3-110.
(C) Paragraph (B) shall not apply to sexual relations between
members and their spouses or to ongoing consensual lawyerclient sexual relations which predate the initiation of the
lawyer-client relationship.
(D) Where a lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with a
client but does not participate in the representation of that
client, the lawyers in the firm shall not be subject to discipline under this rule solely because of the occurrence of
such sexual relations.
(E) A member who engages in sexual relations with his or
her client will be presumed to violate rule 3- 120, paragraph
(B)(3). This presumption shall only be used as a presumption affecting the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings
involving alleged violations of these rules. uPresumption
affecting the burden of proof"' means that presumption
defined in Evidence Code sections 605 and 606.
150. Lawyer-Client Sex Ethics Rule Blocked by Court, L.A. Times, Aug. 28,
1991, § A, at 3, col. 2.
151. See CAL. CIV. CODE, section 726 (West 1988) which says:
The commission of any act of sexual abuse, misconduct, or
relations with a patient, client, or customer which is substantiallY related to the qualifications, functions, or duties
of the occupation for which a license was issued constitutes
unprofessional conduct and grounds for disciplinary action
for any person licensed under this division ....
152. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983).
153. 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991).
154. See discussion supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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with their clients' money. The court held that a breach of the
attorney's fiduciary duty could be found where the attorney's
sexual misconduct physically injured his client. 166 McDaniel
makes it clear that an attorney breaches his fiduciary duty to
his client when, because of his sexual misconduct, he does
not adequately represent his client's interests. In this case,
attorney McDaniel sued his former client Gile for his legal fees.
She cross-complained, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and legal malpractice caused by McDaniel's
unwelcome sexual advances. 16s Gile claimed that when she
refused to have sex with McDaniel, he abandoned her case. She
alleged that this caused her to suffer pecuniary harm when she
settled her divorce case to her disadvantage. 167 She also alleged
she suffered severe emotional distress from McDaniel's conduct. 15S The appellate court reversed the summary judgment in
favor of McDaniel on Gile's claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and attorney malpractice. 169 Concerning
the emotional distress claim, the court noted that a fiduciary
relationship existed between McDaniel and Gile and that "[a]
breach of fiduciary duty by an attorney is actionable whether
it involves financial claims or physical damage resulting from
the violation. "160 It noted that a special relationship existed and
that McDaniel was aware that his client "was peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress because of her pending marital
dissolution. "161 The court described McDaniel's conduct as
"sexual harassment in the scope of the attorney-client relationship" and concluded that Barbara A. permitted such a
claim. 162 It concluded that "the facts of this case are no different
than those alleging sexual harassment in the workplace. "lS3
155. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 383, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422,436 (1983).
156. 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242, 244 (1991). When Patricia Gile first
met with attorney James McDaniel about her pending divorce McDaniel had her "fill
out a lengthy and intimate self-characterization document, seeking intimate details
of[her] personal and sexual life." [d. at 366. When he next met with Gile, McDaniel
"continually referred ... back to the more intimate parts of [Gile's] personal life, particularly remarking about the sexual problems [she] had in [her] marriage." McDaniel
on a different occasion "pinned [Gile] to the wall and kissed [her] on the mouth." [d.
That same day he said to her: "I bet you are so frustrated right now, if 1 put you on
top 1 bet you could last for hours." [d. McDaniel also called Gile at home and work
and sexually harassed her. [d.
157. [d. at 367, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
158. [d.
159. Id. at 365, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
160. [d. at 368, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
161. Id.
162. [d. at 369, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
163. [d.
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The court also allowed Gile to go forward on her legal malpractice claim based on her allegation that McDaniel
abandoned her dissolution action when she refused to have sex
with him. 164 The court concluded that McDaniel "not only
delayed rendering legal services, but also withheld them and
gave substandard services when [Gile] did not grant him sexual favors. This conduct necessarily falls below the standard
of care and skill of members of the legal profession."I66 However,
the court refused to address the issue of whether attorney-client
sex was a "per se violation of the fiduciary duty. "166

McDaniel reaffirms the holding of Barbara A. concerning
fiduciary obligations. It sends a clear message to lawyers
who sexually exploit their clients that such conduct may be
actionable ifit harms their clients' legal position. However, like
Barbara A., McDaniel leaves unanswered the question of
whether a client can recover against her attorney for breach of
fiduciary duty and/or legal malpractice where her attorney's
sexualization of the attorney-client relationship results in
purely emotional distress. The ability of a client to recover in
that situation is discussed in part VIn of this paper.
Turning to the ethical implications of attorney-client sex,
Opinion No. 1987-92 specifically addressed these issues. In a
digest of its conclusions the opinion stated:
No California Rule of Professional Conduct
expressly prohibits a lawyer from having a
sexual relationship with a client. However,
such conduct could in some circumstances
give rise to a violation of rules 6-101 (now 3110 Failing to Act Competently) or 5-102
(now 3- 310 Avoiding the Representation of
Adverse Interests). In addition, such conduct
might present a question as to the client's
ability to consent to a sexual relationship
and also could detrimentally impact on the
client's ability to render independent judgments in the professional relationship.167
This advisory opinion concludes by stating that attorneyclient sex would not per se violate existing ethical rules:
164.
165.
166.
167.

1d. at 370, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
1d.
1d.
Op. 1987-92, infra note 55, at 33 n.8.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/3

40

Forell: Lawyers, Clients and Sex

1992]

LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND SEX

The Committee seeks to respect the division, however unclear, between the private
and professional lives of lawyers. A per se
ban on any sexual relationship with a client
appears overly broad and unnecessary. On
the other hand, the opinion reflects ... the
many perils of a sexual relationship between
lawyer and client. l68
In other words, sometimes attorney-client sex is unethical
and other times it is not. It will be difficult to know when that
line is crossed except in the most egregious cases.
In summary, California attorneys have been given serious
warning signals concerning attorney-client sex by both case law
and their own regulatory system. Nevertheless, untilliability is imposed in cases where the harm is purely emotional, and
a per se ethical rule against attorney-client sex is adopted,
clients will continue to be sexually exploited to the detriment
of those clients, the Bar, and society.
VII.

ETHICAL RULE PROPOSAL

I propose that all jurisdictions adopt a clear per se ethical
rule against most attorney-client sex. Without such a rule,
those responsible for enforcement and the attorneys themselves will continue to be uncertain about when attorneyclient sex is unethical. A clear rule would give both attorneys
and their clients appropriate notice that in most situations sexualization of the attorney-client relationship is unethical. It
would also be strong evidence for the public that attorneys take
peer regulation seriously. It would show the public that the Bar
is willing to regulate attorneys' personal conduct when it
affects their professional relationships and discipline those
attorneys who seek personal gratification at the expense of
their clients' well-being.
The rule I propose is not my own creation. It originated
with Portland attorney and ethics expert Peter Jarvis. He was
inspired to draft this rule by his experience at the meeting in
October 1991 when Oregon lawyers rejected the attorneyclient sex rule proposed to them by the Board of Governors. At
the Convention he spoke out against the Bar's proposed rule
168. [d. at 42.
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because he felt the existing ethics opinion adequately covered
the issue. 169 However, he was sufficiently impressed by the narrow margin by which the rule failed to pass (139 to 107) to
decide that Oregon attorneys would support the adoption of a
well- drafted rule against attorney-client sex. 170 His proposed
rule would read as follows:
(A) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a current client of the lawyer if the sexual relations would,
or would likely, damage or prejudice the client.
(B) A lawyer shall not expressly or impliedly condition
the performance of legal services for a current or
prospective client upon the client's willingness to
engage in sexual relations with the lawyer.
(C) In all other circumstances, a lawyer may have sexual relations with a current client only if (1) the
sexual relationship began prior to the attorney-client
relationship, (2) the lawyer and client are married or
are in an equivalent domestic relationship, or (3)
prior to the beginning of the sexual relationship,
the client consents after full disclosure.
(D) "Full disclosure" shall mean an explanation sufficient
to apprise the recipient of the potential adverse
impact on the recipient that a sexual relationship
may cause. Full disclosure shall also include a recommendation that the client seek independent legal
advice to determine if consent should be given. Full
disclosure shall be contemporaneously confirmed in
writing.
(E) "Sexual relations" shall mean (1) sexual intercourse;
or (2) any touching of the sexual or other intimate
parts of a person or causing such person to touch the
sexual or other intimate parts of the actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of
either party.l7l
169. Transcript, supra note 97, at 137-8.
170. Telephone interview with Peter Jarvis (Jan. 31, 1992).
171. Lawyers are creative creatures. This definition would even cover the situation where a lawyer calls his client and masturbates while talking to her. One of
my attorney friends told me that another lawyer recently subjected his client to this
behavior only a few days prior her hearing on the dissolution of her marriage.
Interview with Eugene attorney Suzanne Chanti (Feb. 4, 1992).
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(F) Where the lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with
a client, the other lawyers in the firm shall not be
subject to discipline solely because of the occurrence
of such sexual relations. 172
This rule is preferable to the proposed Oregon rule because
it is clearer and simpler and explicitly sets out the requirements
for full disclosure.173 It is preferable to the proposed California
rule for these same reasons and more. 174
Unlike the California rule, it does not create a rebuttable
presumption. The California Board of Governors Sex-withClient Subcommittee concluded that a per se rule "would be
struck down as unconstitutional upon judicial challenge" on
both right of privacy and freedom of association grounds. 176 If
indeed there are any constitutional issues presented by a per
se rule (which is doubtful), these are alleviated by the permissive nature of the Jarvis rule, which excepts conduct to
which the client gives informed written consent.
Another improvement of the Jarvis rule over the California
rule is that the situations where sexual relations are completely prohibited by the Jarvis rule also apply to spouses
and preexisting sexual relationships. Considering the highly
unethical nature of the conduct set out in (A) and (B), no
exceptions to the rule's application should be provided as there
are in the California rule. 176
172. This is not part of Jarvis' draft rule; I borrowed this from the proposed ILL.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.17. The proposed Illinois rule states in full:
(a) A lawyer shall not, during the representation of a client,
engage in sexual relations with the client if:
(i) The sexual relations is the result of duress, intimidation, or undue influence by the lawyer; or
(ii) The lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
the client's ability to decide whether to commence
sexual relations is impaired by the client's emotional
or financial dependency, or some other reason.
(b) Where a lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with a
client, the other lawyers in the firm shall not be subject to discipline solely because of the occurrence of such sexual relations.
Chicago B. Ass'n Report, supra note 22, at 45.
173. See proposed DR-510, supra note 136.
174. See proposed rule 3-120, supra note 149.
175. B. Governors Memorandum, supra note 10, at 8, 10.
176. See Paragraph (C), supra text at 66, which says that the prohibitions in
Paragraph (B) do not apply "to sexual relations between members and their spouses
or to ongoing consensual sexual relationships which predate the initiation of the
lawyer-client relationship." My response to this exception is why should it be ethical
for an attorney to coerce or intimidate his wife into having sex with him during the
time in which he is acting as her attorney? It reminds me of the marital rape exception to the crime of rape that has only recently begun to be rejected.
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My endorsement of the Jarvis rule is tempered by my concerns as to whether there are ever situations where a client who
had no preexisting sexual relationship with her attorney can
give genuinely informed consent to sexual relations within
the professional relationship. According to Psychiatrist Peter
Rutter, there are not.177 An attorney friend of mine agrees,
arguing that it is simply not possible for a layperson to sufficiently understand the risks to her interests that sexualization
of her attorney-client relationship creates.178
However, I ultimately favor the informed consent exception
because there are some (although very few) clients and attorneys capable of keeping the two relationships separate.
Moreover, it will be a very extraordinary case where the attorney will want to have sex with his client badly enough to
obtain informed written consent. If such "consent" was
obtained, the client would then have written evidence of her
attorney's intentions, which could later be evidence proving that
sexual relations took place. If the client brought a complaint
or lawsuit against her attorney based on their sexual relations,
the attorney would have to produce this full disclosure document in order to prove he acted ethically. Under these circumstances, it is likely that most lawyers would opt to refrain
from having sex with their clients.
I recommend one final constraint on the Jarvis rule. To
empower the victim, I would limit the ability to allege violation
of this rule to the client only so long as she is a competent adult
and the conduct has no financial impact on anyone else. 179 It is
not appr~priate for the Bar on its own, or, a third party such
as the client's cuckolded husband,18o to have the ability to initiate disciplinary action against the attorney where sexual
relations are the basis of the complaint. Considering the personal costs to the client of revealing this information, it should
be her choice whether to subject herself to that process.
177. P. RUTTER, supra note 5, at 28-9.
178. Interview with Eugene attorney Suzanne Chanti (Feb. 4, 1992).
179. I borrow this idea from Professor Frances Olsen's proposal regarding who
should be able to bring a statutory rape complaint. See Statutory Rape: A Feminist
Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REV. 387, 408 (1984). She suggests that only
underage women themselves should have the power to characterize their "sexual
encounter as voluntary intercourse or as rape." [d. Similarly, I propose that the client
should be the only person with the power to characterize her sexual relationship with
her attorney as consensual or unethical.
180. Cf. my discussion of husbands who seek to recover for their injuries resulting from sexual relations between their wives and psychotherapists, supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
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VIII. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEY-CLIENT SEX
Whether or not the Bar adopts a new ethical rule concerning attorney-client sex, civil liability for harm to the client that
results from sexual relations with her attorney should be
allowed. I will examine the potential for civil liability under
California law, making reference to other states where useful.
I will limit my examination to suits for physical injury resulting from sexual intercourse, and suits for purely emotional and
dignitary injuries based upon professional malpractice, breach
of fiduciary duty, breach of ethical rules, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
California is the only state in the nation with case law
that expressly allows the recovery of money damages in some
situations where injury to a client results from sexual exploitation by her attorney.181 In 1983 the court of appeals decided
Barbara A. u. John 0. 182 Barbara A. held that an attorney's
client stated causes of action for both battery and deceit where
she alleged that, based on her attorney's misrepresentation
regarding his ability to impregnate her, she consented to sexual intercourse with him which resulted in an ectoptic pregnancy from which she nearly died. In 1991 the court of appeals
decided McDaniel u. Gile. 183 McDaniel held that an attorney's
sexual harassment of his client which led to his abandoning her
case when she refused his advances could be the basis for
both an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and attorney malpractice.
Even absent these decisions, if a client could prove that her
attorney's sexual conduct physically injured her as a result of
an intentional tort such as battery or rape, she could recover
against her attorney just as any other party could for such
intentional conduct. Importantly, the Barbara A. court said
that, at least where the client alleges physical injury resulting
from a sexual relationship with her attorney, the fact of the
attorney-client relationship may aid her in proving her case.
The court stated that the "lawyer-client relationship affects the
proof of[the client's] cause of action at trial."184
181. Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 104 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1990).
182. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983) discussed supra notes 11,
15 and accompanying text.
183. 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991) discussed supra notes 156·
66 and accompanying text.
184. Barbara A at 378, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
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The court's reason for allowing the attorney-client relationship to affect the client's burden of proof is that the relationship is a fiduciary one. 1M The court describes a fiduciary
relationship as follows:
The essence of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship is that the parties do not deal on
equal terms, because the person in whom
trust and confidence is reposed and who
accepts that trust and confidence is in a
superior position to exert unique influence
over the dependent party.lS8
Ordinarily, where a fiduciary relationship exists there is a
presumption that the fiduciary exerted undue influence over
his client which he has the burden of rebutting. Apparently
this would be true for an attorney if the breach of his fiduciary obligation involved the client's financial or other nonsexual interest. ls7
However, the Barbara A. court declares that although the
fiduciary duty rule applies where physical injury results from
attorney-client relationship, undue influence should not be
presumed as a matter oflaw where sexual intercourse caused
the injury. In this circumstance, to establish undue influence
the client must instead prove that a confidential relationship
existed. If the client provides sufficent evidence of such a
relationship, then the burden of proving that her participation
was consensual would shift to her attorney. For example, in
Barbara A. the court says that if the client establishes the existence of a confidential relationship, her attorney "would then
have the burden of proving that consent was informed and
freely given in the battery cause of action, or, in the alternative, that her reliance was unjustified in the misrepresentation
185. [d. The court says:

We can find no valid reason to restrict these principles (concerning an attorney's fiduciary relationship) to actions involving financial claims of a client and not to apply them to
actions with which the client alleges physical injury resulting from a violation ofthe attorney's fiduciary obligation.
186. [d. at 379, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
187. [d. Other cases involving breach of an attorney's fiduciary duty to their client
do not assert that the existence of the fiduciary duty in itself creates a presumption
of undue influence. Instead they examine whether the attorney breached his duty with
no mention of this being presumed. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363,
281 Cal. Rptr. 242, 248 (1991); David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr.
339,341-2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1988); Tri-Growth v. Silldorf, 265 Cal. Rptr. 330,
335-6 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1989).
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cause of action. "188 If, however, the client's tort action against
her attorney was for a physical injury such as rape, it would
seem that her showing of a confidential relationship would create a presumption that sexual intercourse was not consensual. This procedural difference could dramatically affect the
client's ability to prove that the sex was non-consensual. 18S
The reason the Barbara A. court gave for applying a different standard in a case where the attorney physically injured
his client through sexual relations was that the parties had a
social as well as a professional relationship. ISO The court
described what happened to Barbara A. as "unique" since at the
time of the alleged sexual encounters Barbara A. consented. It
was the attorney's misrepresention about his inability to
impregnate her that converted her cause of action into one for
an intentional tort. If she had alleged he forcibly raped her, or,
as was alleged in McDaniel, he sexually harassed her, the
court may not have treated this case as involving both a personal and professional relationship and been willing to presume
lack of consent based on the fiduciary relationship without separate proof of a confidential relationship.
In summary, based on Barbara A., it appears that the rule
in California is that where physical injury from attorneyclient sex is alleged, proof by the client of a confidential relationship will shift the burden to the attorney to prove client
consent. Where there was no social relationship between the
parties, this requirement of proof of confidential relationship
may not apply. Thus, the client in McDaniel, who alleged her
attorney made unwelcome sexual advances, could assert a
presumption of nonconsent and undue influence hased on the
attorney-client fiduciary relationship.191
Barbara A. also alleged that her attorney breached his
ethical obligations by having sex with her.l92 The court declined
to decide this issue because the state bar had not yet publicly
188. 145 Cal. App. 3d at 379, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
189. I have difficulty understanding the Barbara A court's assertion that the fiduciary duty covers both financial and physical interests while at the same time it
says a confidential relationship has to be proven in order to recover for injuries to physical interests resulting from sexual intercourse. Are fiduciary and confidential being
used interchangeably? Or is "the highest fiduciary standard w one that presumes a confidential relationship while just a fiduciary duty does not?
190. 145 Cal. App. 3d at 379, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
191. See McDaniel, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
192. Barbara A 145 Cal. App. 3d at 380, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
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addressed it. Since then, ethical concerns over attorney-client
sex have been discussed in detail in Formal Opinion No. 198792. Even without the explicit rule presently being considered by the Bar and the California Supreme Court, Formal
Opinion No. 1987-92 changes the legal landscape from that
which existed at the time Barbara A. was decided. If a suit
alleging physical injury from attorney-client sex was brought
today, it could be appropriate to allege that rules 3-110 (regarding the ability to act competently)193 and 3-310 (regarding conflict of interest)194 were violated and/or transference occurred
that rendered the client unable to meaningfully consent to sexual intercourse. 195 Then, if the plaintiff's allegations were
proved, it would be appropriate for the court to use them "to
define the duty component of the fiduciary duty which the
attorney owes to his or her client. "196

Barbara A. only addressed the situation where, as a result
of attorney-client sex, the client suffered physical harm. 19? In
most cases where attorney-client sex injures the client the
harm will be emotional and dignitary instead. The only case
in the nation to specifically address tort liability for purely emotional harm is the 1990 Illinois appellate decision, Suppressed
u. Suppressed. 19B

Suppressed was an appeal from dismissal of the action
because the trial court determined the two-year personal
193. Op. No. 1987-92, supra note 61, at 34.
194. 1d. at 37 (5-102 is now 3-310).
195. 1d. at 40 n.8 (stating:
The possibility that a client may transfer the confidence
derived from the professional relationship to the sexual
relationship should cause a lawyer to question the client's
ability to consent to the sexual relationship. The cause for
concern may be greater in those cases where the lawyer has
initiated or suggested the idea of having the sexual relationship. If the sexual relationship has been initiated while
the professional relationship is on-going, there may be an
element of undue influence in obtaining the client's consent. Would the client's consent be truly voluntary, or would
it be based on the fear of retaliation that the lawyer may
withdraw from the case or may compromise his or her efforts
because he or she is angry with the client for refusing?).
196. David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 342 (Cal. Ct. App.
1st Dist. 1988).
197. The other relevant California case, McDaniel, involved emotional distress
but the pecuniary harm was also alleged and the basis for the suit was the injuries
resulting from the client's refusal to have sex with her attorney.
198. 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1990). Doe v. Roe, 756 F.Supp. 353
(N.D. Ill. 1991) is not a tort action. Instead the client brought a civil RICO action
against her attorney (the same attorney as in Suppressed).
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injuries statute oflimitation had run. The plaintiff argued that
the five-year statute of limitation applicable to legal malpractice applied. The appellate court specifically addressed the
question of whether attorney-client sex that causes purely
emotional and dignitary harm is recognizable as legal malpractice. The court held it was not for two reasons: (1) the duty
of care allegedly breached by the defendant is not one that arises from the attorney-client relationship, and (2) no actual
damages were alleged. 199
Jeanne Metzger, the plaintiff in Suppressed, alleged that
her attorney "locked his [office] door and then unzipped his
pants. He then requested that plaintiff have oral sex with
him. "200 She complied with his request and on two later occasions complied with his requests to have sexual intercourse
with her. She alleges that these sexual encounters were the
result of psychological coercion and breached her attorney's
fiduciary duty to her. 201
In holding that this conduct did not implicate the attorneyclient fiduciary duty the court said such a duty would only apply
to attorney-client sexual relations where "there is tangible
evidence that the attorney actually made his professional services contingent upon the sexual involvement or that his legal
representation of the client was, in fact, adversely affected."202
The court distinguished an attorney's fiduciary relationship
from that of a psychoanalyst on the grounds that the latter relationship involves transference while the former does not.
Furthermore, the court viewed sexual relations with a client
even where initiated by the attorney in a coercive setting to be
"errors in judgment" rather than a failure "to exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill".203 The Suppressed court
noted that "[a]n attorney, just like the client, is at best and at
worst, a human being fraught with all the frailties that the status entails."204
Based on the holding of Suppressed, this court would not
have allowed the attorney-client relationship in Barbara A. to
199. 565 N.E.2d at 104.
200. [d. at 105. See supra note 63 and accompanying text for Jeanne Metzger's
account of this incident.
201. See supra note 63 and accompanying text for description of how Jeanne
Metzger felt.
202. 565 N.E.2d at 105.
203. [d. at 105.
204. [d.
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have affected the result of the case in any way, since no allegations of quid pro quo or poor legal results were made.
The Suppressed court also concluded that "no actual damages were alleged" since the only injuries Jean Metzger claimed
were purely emotional. 206 Thus the court held that even if the
fiduciary duty had been breached, no liability would have
been allowed. Therefore, even if Jeanne Metzger had been able
to prove that her attorney had made performance of his legal services expressly contingent on having sex with him, unless this
had caused either financial or physical injury to her, no recovery would have been allowed. 206
How would Jeanne Metzger's case have been decided in
California? I will outline four different grounds for tort liability
for a client seeking to recover against her attorney for purely
emotional harm caused by attorney-client sex: 1) attorney
malpractice, 2) breach of fiduciary duty, 3) violation of ethical
rules or guidelines contained in formal opinions, and (4) intentional infection of emotional distress.
First, the client could allege attorney malpractice. The elements of a cause of action for attorney malpractice are:
(1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill,

prudence, and diligence as other members of
the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the
negligent conduct and the resulting injury;
and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from
the professional's negligence. 207
As noted in Day v. Rosenthal 208 : An attorney's duty, the
breach of which amounts to negligence, is not limited to his failure to use the skill required of lawyers. Rather, it is a wider
205. [d.
206. If the McDaniel facts had been before the Illinois court, it might have
allowed the case to proceed, since the attorney was seeking quid pro quo and had abandoned the case to his client's pecuniary detriment when she refused to submit to his
sexual advances. See McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242, (1991)
discussed supra note 153 and accompanying text.
207. Garris v. Severson, 252 Cal. Rptr. 204, 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988)..See
also Budd v. Nixon, 491 P.2d 433 (1971); McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281
Cal. Rptr. 242, 249 (1991).
208. 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 102 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1985).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/3

50

Forell: Lawyers, Clients and Sex

1992]

LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND SEX

661

obligation to exercise due care to protect a client's best interests in all ethical ways and in all circumstances. 209
Without question, a client's best interests, including her
interest in mental tranquility, are adversely affected by attorney-client sex of the kind alleged by Jeanne Metzger in
Suppressed. The client expects to be able to trust her attorney;
a betrayal of that trust through conduct such as that alleged
in Suppressed can devastate an already vulnerable client. If
initiation of sexual relations with a client in the manner
employed by the attorney in Suppressed fell below the standard
of conduct to which members of the bar should adhere, then a
breach of the attorney's duty could be found.
Such conduct could clearly be the proximate cause of emotional distress. That is, emotional distress would be a reasonable and foreseeable consequence of the attorney's
negligence.
The final hurdle in a legal malpractice action is the element
of damages. Recently, a number of California cases have
allowed recovery for damages based on negligent infliction of
emotional distress against attorneys by their clients. The
three leading cases are Betts v. Allstate Ins. CO.210 decided in
1984; Holliday v. Jones 211 decided in 1989; and Tara Motors v.
Superior Ct. (Jasper)212 decided in 1990. In these cases the
client was also able to show either economic damages or interference with the client's liberty interest.
If a client alleging emotional distress from attorney-client
sex could also show that her financial interests were adversely affected, the right to recovery seems quite certain based on
the established caselaw. McDaniel v. Gile is directly on point
209. ld. at 102. The Day court also said:
[I]t is an attorney's duty to "protect his client in every possible way," and it is a violation of that duty for an attorney
to "assume a position adverse to or antagonistic to his client
without the latter's free and intelligent consent given after
full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances.
ld. at 99-100. Certainly, as California Legal Ethics Opinion 1987-92 notes, there are
many instances where attorney-client sexual relations would adversely affect the
client's interests without the client being fully cognizant of this. One of the interests
that could be adversely affected is the clients mental peace of mind ifshe feared retaliation if she did not submit to her attorney's advances. See Op. 1987-92, supra note
at 40.
210. 201 Cal. Rptr. 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1984).
211. 264 Cal.Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1989).
212. 276 Cal. Rptr. 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990).
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and there the court allowed an action for attorney malpractice.213 If, however, as in Jeanne Metzger's case, no financial
harm was alleged, unless she could prove that her liberty
interest was somehow affected, recovery would be an open
question. As the Tara court stated: "We leave for another day
attorney malpractice cases which do not involve such economic losses or the interests discussed in Holliday."214The
rationales for allowing emotional distress injuries in the previously decided attorney malpractice cases apply equally to
those attorney-client sex cases where a breach of the attorney's
duty of care has caused emotional distress. The court in
Holliday v. Jones, explaining why attorneys must be held to
high standards similar to those for other professionals, said
that "a special rule benefitting only negligent lawyers" would
be detrimental to both the public and the profession. The
court continued: "In our view, not only is such a special interest rule unfair, but public perceptions regarding it poorly
serve the broader interests of the legal profession."216 The
Holliday court reasoned that if a patient proved an improper
psychiatic diagnosis had caused her mistaken committment,
the California Supreme Court case of Molien v.Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals 216 would clearly allow recovery for emotional harm against the negligent psychiatrist. It therefore
found that it was appropriate to allow recovery for emotional
distress where defendant attorney's negligent representation
of his client resulted in his client being convicted of murder and
imprisoned.
The Holliday court's analogy to other professions is also
appropriate in cases involving attorney-client sex. In
California, a psychiatrist's patient can recover for emotional
distress against the psychiatrist because the psychiatrist
engaged in sexual relations with the patient's wife.217 The
213. The McDaniel court made it clear that this was malpractice. It said:
The facts before this court show that [McDaniel] not only
delayed rendering legal services, but also withheld them
and gave substandard services when [Gile] did not grant him
sexual favors. This conduct necessarily falls below the standard of care and skill of members of the legal profession. Id.
at 370.
214. 276 Cal. Rptr. at 669 n.7.
215. 264 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
216. 616 P.2d 813 (1980) (noting that a complaint alleging that defendant doctor had negligently concluded that plaintiff's wife had syphilis, had instructed the wife
to advise plaintiff of the diagnosis, and had required plaintiff to submit to a blood test
adequately stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.).
217. Richard H. v. Larry D., M.D., 243 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1988).
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basis for recovery in such a medical malpractice actions is
"liability for breach of [] professional and fiduciary responsibilities."2lB A psychiatrist who has sex with his patient should
also be held liable for any emotional distress damages the
patient herself suffers. 219 An attorney should not be treated differently when he causes the same kind of harm to his client by
engaging in the same conduct.
The California Supreme Court recently narrowed the
grounds of recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress in a bystander case, Thing v. La Chusa. 22o Nevertheless,
it is still appropriate to allow recovery for direct emotional distress in cases like Jeanne Metzger's. Furthermore, attorney
liability is already circumscribed by the general limitation of
recovery to clients only and the harm alleged must be directly caused by the attorney-client relationship.221
In summary, although there are no cases directly on point,
there is a strong argument based on analogous cases that a
client who alleges emotional harm from an attorney-client
sexual relationship will, in some instances, be able to recover
on the grounds of attorney malpractice.
A related equitable claim can also be made based on breach
of the attorney's fiduciary relationship to his client. Barbara
A. could be extended to purely emotional harm based on the
Bar's Ethical Opinion No. 1987-92 referring to the various
ethical problems with many attorney-client sexual relationships. Where the breach of fiduciary duty has resulted in
economic injury, the courts have expressly based a finding of
breach on the relevant ethical rules. For example, in David
Welch Co. v. Erskine & TuUey222 the court held that defendant
attorney breached his fiduciary duty to his former client by violating rules 4-101 and 5-101 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. The court noted that "these rules, together with
the statutes and general principles relating to other fiduciary
218. 1d. at 810.
219. See Waters v. Bourhis, 40 Cal. 3d 424, 434,709 P.2d 469, 475, 220 Cal. Rptr.
666,673 (1985) (client sued her attorney for charging excessive fees for settling a case
against her psychiatrist who sexually exploited her). But see Atienza v. Taub, 194 Cal.
App. 3d 388, 239 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1987) (physician's sexual relationship with patient
not medical malpractice where not initiated under guise of treatment).
220. 771 P.2d 814 (1989).
221. Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737 (1976). See also Tara Motors v. Superior
Ct. (Jasper), 276 Cal. Rptr. 603, 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990).
222. 250 Cal. Rptr. 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1988).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

53

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 3

664

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:611

relationships, all help define the duty component of the fiduciary duty which the attorney owes to his or her client. 223
A client alleging injuries similar to those suffered by Jeanne
Metzger could allege that her attorney breached his fiduciary
duty to her by violating rules 3-110 and 3-310. 224 The client
could also allege her attorney misused transference, thereby
negating the client's consent through the exercise of undue
influence, as discussed in Califonia Ethical Opinion No. 198792.226.

A third basis for civil liability might exist in violation of the
ethical rules themselves. 226 The only cases in California where
such claims have been made involved third parties who sued
opposing counsel based on those lawyers' conduct in the case
against the third party.227 While recovery has been denied in
these cases, a suit based on violations of ethical rules brought
by a client against her own attorney is clearly distinguishable.
It does not present the specter of chilling access to the courts
that actions by third parties raise. 228
Although other jurisdictions have generally denied recovery where a cause of action is based solely on the breach of an
ethical rule, those cases, like the California cases, have for the
most part involved actions by third parties.229 A much more
223. Id. at 343. See also Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1985).
224. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
225. Op. 1987-92, supra note 61, at 40.
226. See Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of
Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281 (1979). See generally Forell,
The Interrelationship of Statutes and Tort Actions, 66 OR. L. REV. 219 (1987); Forell,
The Statutory Duty Action in Tort: A Statutory / Common Law Hybrid, 23 IND. L. REV.
781 (1990).
227. See, e.g., Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (Cal. Ct. App.
2d Dist. Div. 4 1973).
228. See Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981) in
which the court sets out why it refuses to create a new tort action based on an ethical violation alleged by a third party. It points out that the legislature (or Bar) did
not intend to create a tort action. Of course, this shouldn't stop the court from creating one so long as the legislature or Bar didn't clearly intend to bar such an action.
It then points to other remedies, most notably malicious prosecution. Such an action
is not available to a client injured as a result of attorney-client sex. And, at this point
and time, no other remedy is available either. Finally the court pointed to the danger that exposing attorneys to liability to third parties could chill the public's access
to the courts. This rationale is clearly inapplicable to attorney-client sex cases. Id.
at 326, 630 P.2d at 848.
229. See O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 613, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Bob Godfrey
Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981). Bob Godfrey lists the jurisdictions which have rejected such an action. Id. at 325, 630 P.2d at 847.
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compelling case for allowing an action based on violation of ethical standards exists where the injured party is the attorney's
client to whom he owed a fiduciary duty.
A final basis for civil liability in a case like Jeanne Metzger's
would be intentional infliction of emotional distress. McDaniel
v. Gile allowed such an action where the client who was sexu23o
ally harassed alleged both financial and emotional harm.
However, so long as the conduct is both intentional and outrageous, purely emotional harm is recoverable. To recover
under this claim a client must show: (1) outrageous conduct
by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe
emotional suffering, and (4) actual and proximate causation of
the emotional distress. 231
As the McDaniel court noted, conduct is more likely to be
found outrageous where a power relationship such as attorneyclient exists. 232 The kind of attorney conduct that Jeanne
Metzger described in her personal statement satisfies both
the "outrageous" and "intentional" elements of the action. 233
Metzger's attorney clearly acted both outrageously and intentionally when he forced her to have oral sex in his office. It is
quite likely that in some situations, like that of Jeanne Metzger,
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress can be
made out where the attorney sexually exploits his client.
In summary, at least four theories of recovery may be available to clients who allege emotional distress injuries from
attorney-client sexual relations. It remains to be seen whether
the California courts will do justice by allowing recovery under
one or all of these bases. If the California courts refuse to allow
recovery for emotional distress in this context, I would urge the
California state legislature to enact a statute creating such liability.234
230. McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991).
231. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 946, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141,603 P.2d 58
(1979). Accord McDaniel, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
232. McDaniel, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
233. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair
Advantage of the «Fair" Sex, 53 ALB. L. REV. 95,139-141 (1988) (proposed statute called
"Uniform Sexual Exploitation Act" creating tort liability whenever a fiduciary has sex
with his client).
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As explained at the beginning ofthis paper, this is a tale of
three jurisdictions. I have discussed the responses of Oregon
and California to attorney-client sexual relations in detail. I
will conclude with an examination of Illinois' treatment of
this issue. What has occurred in Illinois is truly frightening.
It is a demonstration of raw power silencing the voices of
women clients who have been brutally victimized.
Women who allege their attorneys have sexually exploited
them in Illinois simply do not stand a chance of recovering for
their injuries or seeing the offenders punished. Although
approximately 50 complaints related to the sexual misconduct of attorneys are brought to the attention of Illinois
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC)
each year, I have been unable to find a single reported case
where an attorney was disciplined following such a complaint. 236
Included among the attorneys who have not been publicly
disciplined is the unnameable attorney who was sued by two
of his clients in Suppressed v. Suppressed 236 and Doe v. Roe 237 •
According to the Professor John Elson, the attorney who represented both of these clients in their suits against Mr.
Unnameable, two additional women have filed formal
grievances against this man, and Professor Elson knows of two
other victims who have not yet come forward. 238 That makes
six victims of a single attorney. Professor Elson told me that he
felt it wa~ extremely unlikely that this attorney would be disciplined in any way because of these complaints. 239
The lack of any meaningful attorney discipline in Illinois
leaves civil litigation as the only possible way to obtain a remedy, punish the offenders, and let the public know who the sex235. California is no better. According to Henry Contreras, Chief Consultant to
Assemblywoman Roybal-Allard, no attorneys have ever been publicly disciplined in
California for sexual misconduct affecting their clients. Presentation on AttorneyClient Sex, February 8, 1992, Golden Gate University School of Law. In contrast,
Oregon has two recent cases in which an attorney was disciplined at least in part
because he had sex with his client. See In re Ofelt, 1 D.B. Rptr. 22 (Or. 1985); In re
Wolf, 312 Or. 655 (1992).
236. 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1990).
237. 756 F.Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
238. Chicago B. Ass'n Report, supra note 22, at 14.
239. Telephone interview with Professor John Olson, Jan. 20, 1992.
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ual predators are. But in Illinois that avenue has also been
effectively eliminated. When Jeanne Metzger first planned to
file her suit for money damages in Chicago against her attorney in 1988, the attorney successfully obtained an injunction
requiring that the filing of the suit be kept secret. Presiding
Chancery Division Judge David J. Shields directed the clerk to
accept the filing of Mr. Unnameable's complaint for injunctive
relief "without revealing the names or identities of the parties. "240 Judge Shields issued a temporary restraining order,
impounded the file and ordered Metzger's attorney to file her
suit with him instead of in the clerk's office. 241
Metzger's attorney, John Elson, filed the suit with Judge
Shields as ordered. Since the suit alleged a tort, it actually
belonged in the Law Division, so Judge Shields telephoned Law
Division Presiding Judge Sorrentino and "explained the situation." An emergency closed door meeting was held, which also
included Judge Foreman of the Law Division's motion section.242 After this meeting Foreman impounded the Law
Division file and imposed a gag order on Metzger and Elson forbidding them to discuss the names of the litigants or the contents of the complaint with anyone. 243 The gag order would
automatically be lifted if Mr. Unnameable lost his pending
motion to dismiss the complaint. However, he won the motion
to dismiss, and even though the case came to an end when the
Illinois Supreme Court declined review of Suppressed in 1990,
those connected with the suit are still not sure if they would be
found in contempt if they revealed the name of Metzger's former attorney.U4
These proceedings appear to be in blatant violation of both
constitutional and statutory law. For example, in Nixon v.
Warner Communications,246 the United States Supreme Court
said that "[it] is clear that the courts of this country recognize
a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents. "246 There is
also a statutory right in Illinois to public access to court
records. Illinois Revised Statutes, Ch. 25, Section 16 states that
240. Warden, supra note 24, at 11·12.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See supra note 35, where excerpts of the gag order are set out verbatim.
244. Telephone interviews with Professor John Elson and attorney Margaret
Paris, Jan. 20, 1992.
245. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
246. Id. at 597.
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"[a]11 records, dockets and books required by law to be kept by
[circuit court] clerks shall be deemed public records, and shall
at all times be open to public inspection .... "247
Mr. Unnameable nonetheless succeeded in keeping his
name from the public, a public which includes future victims
of his sexual conduct. Judge Shields commented on his suppression of the records by saying: "I knew this belonged in the
Law Division and I didn't care what the Law Division did
with it, but I didn't want the allegations to become public by
accident. "248 Even more disturbing are the facts alleged in the
RICO action against Mr. Unnameable by another former female
client. The facts, as stated in the court's opinion, are as follows:
In April 1983, Doe met Roe at a social gathering. After inquiring about her divorce proceeding, Roe suggested Doe's counsel was
inadequate and that he could do a better
job. In June 1983, Doe went to Roe's office
to discuss her divorce. Roe again derided the
work of Doe's counsel and she decided to
hire Roe instead. In July, Doe paid a $7,500
retainer. No written agreement was entered
into ...
Doe placed great trust in Roe because
he was her attorney and because she understood he had an outstanding reputation.
Additionally, because of the emotionally trying nature of the divorce proceeding, Roe
advised Doe on personal matters as well as
legal matters. As a result, Doe developed a
psychological dependency on Roe. On her
second visit to Roe's office, Roe made sexual advances. Doe initially resisted, but Roe
persisted. Although Plaintiff felt repulsed
by Roe's sexual advances, she submitted
because of her fear that otherwise he would
not represent her and that since she could
not afford a retainer fee to hire a third counsel in her divorce case, she might go unrepresented and lose both custody of her child
and the opportunity for financial security for
247. Warden, supra note 24, at 9.
248. Id.
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herself and her child. From 1983 through
1988 Doe continued to submit to Roe's sexual demands, at his offices, in her home,
and'at other locations. Doe continued to do
so because of both her emotional dependency and her fear of what would happen if she
lost Roe's legal representation ...
In November 1989, after Doe's present
attorney first wrote a letter to Roe indicating Doe would seek redress for her injuries
and that Roe should not contact Doe except
through counsel, Roe nevertheless made
threatening phone calls directly to Doe.
Among other threats, he threatened to "rip
Plaintiff to shreds," to "get everyone he knew
to make her look terrible - like a slut," and
to "get her for this." Roe also informed Doe
"she should be concerned about her family,
her reputation, and the success of her business." Roe continued to make harassing
phone calls to Doe at her house. Also, in
December 1989, he sent her a note stating
"DON'T DO THIS TO ME/YOU'LL BE
SORRY." In January 1990, Roe approached
Doe on a sidewalk in downtown Chicago
and shouted obscene epithets at her. On
an afternoon in June 1990, a middle-aged
male in business attire, who was acting at
Roe's direction, approached Doe at an intersection in downtown Chicago and made a
vulgar sexual proposition. 249
This is just a portion of Doe's tale of abuse. Roe also went
after Doe's attorney who is employed by Northwestern
University in their law school's legal clinic:
On October 4, 1990, Roe wrote Northwestern
University's general counsel threatening to
sue the University for malicious prosecution after the successful dismissal of the
present lawsuit unless the University intervened to have the lawsuit dismissed. Prior
249. Doe v. Roe, 756 F. Supp, 353, 356 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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to the letter, Roe is alleged to have had a
friend who is a "prominent" Northwestern
Law School alumnus contact the University's
general counsel regarding Doe's continued
representation by the Legal Clinic. The
alumnus had also contacted Northwestern
University Law School's current dean and
former dean. 26o
The tale of Illinois has another chapter. When Albert
Brooks Friedman sought to collect fees from his female divorce
client, she refused to pay the $15,500 he claimed was owed,
partly because he billed her for the hours they spent having sexual intercourse.261 When Friedman sued to collect these fees,
the trial court granted his motion for summary judgment and
denied his former client's petition. On appeal the appellate
court reversed the judgment and award of$16,392.17 in attorney fees and remanded the case for trial. However, it expressly refused to reach the issue of whether the alleged sexual
relationship breached Friedman's fiduciary duty.262 As mentioned earlier in this paper, after this case was filed the
Supreme Court of Illinois appointed Friedman to the committee on character and fitness of the State Board of Law
Examiners.263
There may be some hope for Illinois, however. In his special concurrence in In re Marriage of Kantar, Justice Greiman
states that he believes Friedman's alleged sexual misconduct
should have been addressed by the appellate court. He
describes attorney-client sex as the legal profession's "dirty little secret. "264 He then examines the issue in detail, and concludes that "where there is an allegation of sexual relationship
between a domestic relations lawyer and client ... [this] constitutes a per se conflict of interest. "266 His remedy is excellent:
once a sexual relationship occurs, the attorney's "per se conflict
of interest ... would render his fees forfeit where the client
250. Id.
251. In re Marriage of Kantar, 581 N.E.2d 6, 9 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1991).
252. Id. at 11.
253. Gill & Holt, Burpa note 24, at 10.
254. 581 N.E.2d at 12. Attorneys in California keep dirty little secrets too. In
McDaniel v. Gile the client who was sexually harassed by her attorney claimed that
the attorney had done similar things to other women divorce clients "and that his reputation for this was 'well known around the Ontario courthouse.'" 230 Cal. App. 3d
363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245 (1991).
255. 581 N.E.2d at 12.
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brings the matter to the attention of the court within a reasonable time and provides evidence sufficient to carry her
burden of proof. "268
There have been some attempts towards change. The
Illinois legislature at the behest of Jeanne Metzger57 passed a
resolution in 1991 requesting "that a rule of professional conduct governing sexual relations between attorneys and their
clients be adopted ... ".258 The legislature was dissuaded from
passing a statute like California's by the weak argument that
such a statute would violate separation ofpowers. 259 Another
ray of hope has come from the Chicago Bar Association, which
has drafted a rule regulating attorney-client sex that the
Association has forwarded to the Illinois Supreme Court.260
X.

CONCLUSION

Attorney-client sex injures women and the legal profession.
Only recently have these injuries begun to receive serious
public scrutiny. The pressure to adopt ethical rules restricting attorney-client sex must continue. Similarly, courts should
seriously consider imposing civil liability for physical and
emotional injuries suffered from attorney-client sex. The law
must no longer silence the voices of women clients who are
victims of such conduct. If the courts and legal profession
refuse to act, the state legislatures should. One possible legislative remedy could be a statutory tort claim against any professional who abuses his trust by sexually exploiting his client.
A draft of such a statute was set out in a recent article by
Professor Phyllis Coleman. 261 The cause of action would be analogous to the sexual harassment actions now available where
such harms occur in the workplace.
The law profession's dirty little secret is secret no more.
Hopefully, the light now being shed on it will cause change from
within the legal profession before change from without is
imposed.
256. [d. at 16.
257. Telephone interview with Jeanne Metzer, Jan. 28, 1992.
258. S. Res. 361, 87th General Assembly, 1991 Illinois.
259. Telephone interview with John Elson, Jan. 20, 1991.
260. Grady, Crawford, & O'Brien, supra note 22. The proposed rule is set out
supra note 136.
261. See Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair
Advantage of the "Fair- Sex, 53 ALB. L. REV. 95,139·141 (1988).
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